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NSA SURVEILLANCE SINCE 9/11 AND THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO PRIVACY
G. Alex Sinha*
ABSTRACT
Since shortly after 9/11, if not earlier,the National Security
Agency (NSA) has been collecting massive amounts of data about
American citizens and permanent residents, ostensibly with the
aim of preempting future terrorist attacks. While the NSA's
program has invited substantial scholarly attention, specifically
concerning its compliance with the United States Constitution and
various domestic statutes, the academic debate about its merits
entirely omits one crucial fact: the United States is also legally
obliged to protect a human right to privacy, as codified in Article
17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). This Article seeks to eliminate the blind spot caused by
that omission, illustrating the relevance of human rights for
assessing the legality and propriety of NSA surveillance. It argues
that even under conservative assumptions about the scope of the
NSA program and the coverage of the ICCPR, there is good reason
to think that the program violates the covenant. At the very least,
as this detailed case study of the NSA program demonstrates,
more clarity from the Human Rights Committee on the right to
privacy is essential in a world characterized by increasing
government surveillance.
Section I of this Article provides a brief history of domestic
* Aryeh Neier Fellow, Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union. The research for and writing of this Article took place prior to my affiliation
with HRW or the ACLU, and the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the
positions of either organization. I am deeply grateful to Philip Alston for his
valuable input throughout the process of researching and writing this Article. I am
also thankful to Smita Narula, Faiza Patel, and Ira Rubinstein for their excellent
comments, as well as to audiences at the April 2013 Emerging Human Rights
Scholarship Conference and the 2012-13 International Human Rights Clinic (both at
New York University School of Law). All errors are my own.
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spying in the United States, leading up to and through the
passage of the Foreign latelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA). FISA constituted the first major legislative effort to
regulate the electronic surveillance of American citizens or
permanent residents within the United States for foreign
intelligence or international counterterrorism purposes, and
Section I concludes by outlining the key provisions of this
landmark statute. Section II traces the chronology of revelations
about the NSA program and relevant statutory developments,
starting with the original disclosure of the program in December
of 2005 and ending with revelations made in August of 2013.
Section III of the Article explains why Article 17 of the ICCPR
applies with full force to the United States, while Section IV
unpacks some of the language of Article 17 to illustrate why its
provisions apply to the activities of the NSA. Finally, Section V
explores several ways in which the NSA program appears to
violate the provisions of Article 17.
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INTRODUCTION
As of 2010, the National Security Agency (NSA) was
collecting and storing nearly two billion emails, phone calls, and
other communications every day,' as well as countless points of
transactional data, all as part of a surveillance program that
remains in place. Many of these communications and data points
exclusively concern Americans suspected of no wrongdoing
whatsoever. 2 It is quite possible that current domestic law
1. Dana Priest & William Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,
WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, at 3, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secretIt is difficult to locate
americalarticles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/3/.
more recent data on that point, though in March 2013 alone, the NSA apparently
gathered nearly 100 billion pieces of information from worldwide computer networks,
with three billion coming from United States computer networks. Glenn Greenwald
& Ewen MacAskill, Boundless Informant: the NSA's secret tool to track global
surveillance data, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining.
2. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of
Verizon customers daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013 [hereinafter Greenwald, NSA
collecting phone records], http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order (detailing the government's ongoing collection of all of
Verizon's calling records completely irrespective of the government's level of
suspicion of Verizon customers): Glenn Greenwald & James Ball, The top secret rules
that allow NSA to use US data without a warrant, GUARDIAN, June 20, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
(describing the government's ability to review and use the communications of
Americans collected inadvertently).
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(amended repeatedly since 9/11) permits the NSA to do at least
some of this, ostensibly with the aim of protecting the United
States from future terrorist attacks.3 Domestic legal changes
notwithstanding, this Article asks whether and how international
human rights law (as codified in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, or ICCPR) bears on the domestic
surveillance activities of the NSA-a question that has gone all
but ignored in the debate about the NSA program that began
when the New York Times first revealed the secret program in
December of 2005.4 The Article concludes that the NSA program
is worrisome from a human rights standpoint, and calls on
international human rights bodies to clarify and emphasize the
right to privacy.
CONTEXT
In December of 2005, the New York Times reported that
President Bush had authorized the NSA to eavesdrop on domestic
phone calls and collect private emails without court-approved
warrants.' According to the Times, President Bush authorized
the program in a secret 2002 executive order.' The Times also
reported that it had possessed documentation of the NSA
program for months before running the article but had held off
from publishing it under pressure
from the Bush
Administration. The article spurred some members of Congress
to attempt to conduct oversight of the program,' and the
3. See Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records, supra note 2 (describing the
breadth of the government's efforts to collect purely domestic transactional data, as
authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under the "business
records" provision of the USA PATRIOT Act); cf. Letter from Am. Civil Liberties
Union to the U.S. Senate (June 25, 2008) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], available at
http://www.aclu.org/images/generallasset-upload__file902_35782.pdf
(arguing that
the FISA Amendments Act "unconstitutionally and unnecessarily permits the
government
to vacuum
up
international communications,
without
a
connection .. . even to national security").
4. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.
html?pagewanted=all (offering the first public description of any part of this
surveillance program).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. See Douglas Jehl, Among Those Told of Program, Few Objected, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/23/politics/23intel.html?r=1&
(suggesting that sudden public attention focused on the NSA program, which began
with the original New York Times story, served as a catalyst for a variety of oversight

2013] NSA Surveillance and the Human Right to Privacy 865
disclosure of the program introduced a new element into the
ongoing debate about the difficulties of protecting both national
security and civil liberties. The Times article also sparked an
outcry from those concerned that the NSA program was illegal.'
Indeed, over the past few years, scholars have repeatedly
analyzed the known elements of the NSA program under
domestic legislation (like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act) and the United States Constitution. Concerns about the
program's compliance with domestic statutes have led to
substantial revisions of federal surveillance laws-for example, to
inoculate major telecommunication companies from civil liability
for their complicity in the programo and to relax restrictions on
the collection of foreign-to-foreign communications that pass
through the United States.n
But the United States also has international legal
obligations, which have been almost completely overlooked in the
NSA controversy. Though it is generally reluctant to bind itself
under human rights treaties, 1 2 the United States ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in

attempts).
9. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Finally punishing the wrongdoers in the NSA
PM),
3:53
30,
2005,
(Dec.
BLOG
TERRITORY
scandal, UNCLAIMED
http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2005/12/finally-punishing-wrongdoers-in-nsa.ht
ml (referring to the program as "illegal" a mere two weeks after the New York Times
revealed it).
10. Pamela Hess, Senate Immunizes Telecom Firms From Wiretap Lawsuits, N.Y.
SUN, July 9, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/national/senate-grants-telecom-companiesimmunity/81525/.
11. Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, House Approves Wiretap Measure, WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
PoST, Aug. 5, 2007,
2007/08/04/AR2007080400285.html?nav-rss-politics.
12. See International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Oct. 5,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/
at
3,
available
993
U.N.T.S.
1977,
(indicating
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang-en
that the United States has signed but not ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, a treaty with 161 parties); Convention on the
Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women, July 17, 1980, 1249
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.
at
available
13,
U.N.T.S.
aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang-en (indicating that the United
States has signed but not ratified the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, a treaty with 187 parties); Convention on the Rights
3,
available at
U.N.T.S.
1577
16,
1995,
Feb.
Child,
the
of
https://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?mtdsg-no=IV-1 1&chapter=4&lang-en
(indicating that the United States has signed but not ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, a treaty with 193 parties).
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1992.1' Article 17 of the ICCPR codifies a human right to
privacy, and at the very least, questions arise as to whether the
NSA program violates that right. 1 4 The lack of debate about the
relationship between the NSA program and the United States'
human rights obligations may in part reflect a deeper problem:
that human rights bodies have not addressed the issue of
electronic surveillance in sufficient detail to clarify state
obligations surrounding activities like those currently ongoing in
Additionally, there remain numerous
the United States.
important questions about the precise size and shape of the NSA
program, complicating any assessment of whether the program is
compatible with the ICCPR.
Nevertheless, the question is an important one. Having
chosen to bind itself to the terms of the ICCPR, gaining whatever
public relations and political benefits such a choice entails, the
United States may not simply disregard the attendant legal
obligations. If it turns out that the United States is violating the
terms of Article 17, then only a series of very specific conditions
could allow the United States to escape the conclusion that it is in
violation of its human rights obligations. As it happens, those
conditions-relating to derogation under the terms of the ICCPR,
to blanket inapplicability of the treaty, or to reservations,
understandings and declarations (RUDs) attached by the United
States to the relevant article of the ICCPR-do not obtain in this
case.15 Thus, in essence, if the NSA program violates the
protections laid out in the ICCPR, then the United States is also
violating its human rights obligations. 16
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg-no=iv-4&chapter=4
&1ang-en (documenting the United States' ratification of the Covenant on June 8,
1992).
14. Id. ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy. . . .").
15. The United States has, however, declared that the substantive articles of the
ICCPR are not "self-executing," which means that individuals protected by the treaty
cannot seek judicial enforcement of the treaty's provisions against the United States
without additional domestic legislation licensing such judicial action. See ICCPR,
supra note 13 (detailing the United States' position on self-execution).
16. While a state may generally violate a treaty that is not self-executing without
triggering the full range of consequences considered typical of domestic legal
transgressions, states tend to contest allegations of human rights abuses in vigorous
terms. Allegations of human rights violations implicitly carry strong normative
condemnation and form the grounds for wide-ranging criticism from individuals, civil
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This conclusion, if warranted, would be significant for at
least two reasons. First and foremost, human rights treaties and
covenants are designed to prevent human rights violations.
Accordingly, as a normative matter, we should not simply abide
human rights violations without any public debate in those terms
and without an explicit (and legitimate) justification from the
violator. The United States has argued that the program is legal
under domestic law-though many commentators and some
federal judges have disagreed. To the best of my knowledge,
however, the government has not explained in any detail why the
program is legal under the ICCPR. "
Moreover, if it is illegal, given the apparent scope of the NSA
program, the number of violations of the human right to privacy
could easily climb into the millions, billions, or even trillions."
The extensive and systematic nature of the program could thus
compel the conclusion that the United States is violating the
human right to privacy within its borders on a truly colossal
scale.
I. THE ORIGINAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Analysis of the relevant terms of the ICCPR will be most
useful later, following an exposition of the details of the NSA
program; however, a brief review of Article 17 will help to reveal
what information is necessary to undertake a proper analysis and
will thus help to provide a form for the ensuing investigation.
Article 17 of the ICCPR comprises two clauses. Article 17(1)
states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
society groups, and other states. It would be an extremely surprising result for the
U.S. to concede human rights violations on the ground that it cannot necessarily be
held accountable by a court for those violations.
17. In 2011, the government submitted its Fourth Periodic Report of the United
States of America to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights Concerning
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Its discussion of Article 17
refers to the NSA program, but entirely glosses over why such a program would be
permissible under the terms of the ICCPR. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOURTH
PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON

CIVIL

AND

POLITICAL

RIGHTS

f

321-35

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm#artl7.

(Dec.

30,

2011),

available at

Additional research has turned up

no further explanation from the government of the legality of the program under
international human rights law.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 347-354.
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nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation." 19 Article
17(2) adds: "Everyone has the right to protection of the law
immediate
our
against such interference or attacks."20 For
purposes, it suffices to note that "unlawful" in this context
encapsulates (but is not exhausted by) activities that contravene
domestic law,2 which suggests that understanding the domestic
legal framework for conducting surveillance is essential to the
present analysis. To illustrate that framework, the following
Section provides a brief history of the primary operative statute
governing surveillance for the purposes of gathering foreign
intelligence and combating international terrorism-the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978-before tracing the outlines
of the NSA program and more recent legislative developments
that have modified the law.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF 20TH CENTURY DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
arose out of perceived government surveillance abuses that
It constituted the first
largely began around the 1930s.2 2
comprehensive legislative response to the privacy concerns raised
by public revelations about the scope of domestic surveillance
that had occurred under various presidents (from both parties)
beginning in the early-to-mid-twentieth century.2 3 Technological
advances started to make it easier for the government to monitor
people, whether they were located abroad or at home. Until the
1960s and early 1970s-when the public and the courts first
began to confront in earnest the issue of domestic surveillance25
the government took full advantage of its growing capacity to spy.
19. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17(1).
20. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17(2).
21. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CCPR COMMENTARY 382 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (interpreting the meaning of "lawful" in
just this way).
22. See US SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS:
1976 US SENATE REPORT ON ILLEGAL WIRETAPS AND DOMESTIC SPYING BY THE FBI,
CIA AND NSA 16 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT] (noting that

warrantless wiretapping began to occur frequently in the 1930's).
23. See text accompanying notes 22-44 (providing numerous examples).
24. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 239 (describing the
Obviously, modern
technological capabilities at the time of FISA's passage).
technological developments have increased the capacity for spying.
25. There are some modest exceptions, but not enough to undermine the point.

2013] NSA Surveillance and the Human Right to Privacy 869
Between 1947 and 1973, as part of its SHAMROCK
Program, the government collected and turned over to the NSA
millions of telegrams that originated within, terminated in, or
traveled through the United States.26 Some of these telegrams
constituted purely citizen-to-citizen correspondence (telegrams
sent by Americans to other Americans).2 7 Senders were never
notified that the government had collected their telegrams, and
telegraph company executives who assisted with the program
received assurance that they would not be prosecuted because the
program was 'in the highest interests of the nation.' 2 8
Sometime in the early 1960s, the NSA began to assemble
"watch lists" that contained the names of American citizens.2 9
Originally designed to track those traveling to Cuba as well as
those who might pose a danger to the President and other highlevel officials, by the fall of 1967, the watch list program had
morphed into a systematic attempt to track Americans who might
be involved in civil disturbances-with a focus on civil rights and
antiwar groups.3 0
In 1969, the NSA implemented Project
MINARET, which tightened the security around its watch list
program and expanded its scope.3 1 Under President Nixon,
MINARET grew to cover approximately 300,000 targets.3 2
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also participated
in domestic surveillance during this era. It began to undertake
some measure of warrantless wiretapping in 1931, and continued
almost without pause at least through 1975." During that time,
the scope of FBI surveillance was especially broad, though a few
representative highlights will suffice for present purposes. For
example, during this era and as part of the FBI's COMINFIL
(communist infiltration) Program, the FBI conducted substantial
surveillance of the NAACP for approximately twenty-five years26. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 119. The Church Committee

describes a slightly different range of dates later in its report. See id. at 407 (pegging
the SHAMROCK Program down to the years between 1945 and 1975).
27. Id. at 120.
28. Id. at 104.
29. Id. at 392.
30. Id. at 392-93.
31. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 395-96.
32. GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE
MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW 37 (2010).

33. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 242 (summarizing the
approach of all three branches to the FBI's warrantless surveillance, from the
program's inception up until the writing of the report).
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notwithstanding both the agency's own "initial finding that the
NAACP was opposed to communism" and the agency's continued
inability to locate any evidence to the contrary.3 4
The FBI also developed COINTELPRO (counterintelligence
program), which was "designed to 'disrupt' groups and 'neutralize'
individuals deemed to be threats to domestic security."3 5 It was
under the auspices of COINTELPRO that the FBI vigorously
employed a wide range of surveillance techniques to discredit civil
rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.36 At one point, the FBI
shared one of its surveillance tapes with Dr. King, with the stated
goal (according to at least one agent) of destroying his marriage.
They also sent a note that "Dr. King and his advisors interpreted
as a threat to release the tape unless Dr. King committed
suicide."3
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in
domestic surveillance during this era as well.38 Between 1940
and 1973, the CIA and FBI secretly-and illegally, according to
an investigating Senate committee 3 9 -"opened and photographed
first class letter mail within the United States" 40 with the
purpose of collecting "foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
information."4 1 Over that span, the two agencies implemented
twelve separate programs that involved opening private mail and
recording its contents,42 and copies of that correspondence
remained on-hand at least through 1976.43 The collective scope of
the programs is difficult to discern, but apparently just one of
these programs collected and photographed over 215,000 pieces of
correspondence.44
34.

CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 125.

35. Id. at 14.
36. Id. at 14-15.
37. Id. at 15.
38. In listing programs run by the NSA, FBI, and CIA, I do not mean to imply
that these were the only organizations involved in performing surveillance on
Americans. Instead, I have simply attempted to capture a representative crosssection of the operative programs to show the widespread nature of domestic
surveillance. As discussed below, even the U.S. Army was involved in such activities
during the 1970s.
39. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 294.
40. Id.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 295.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 295 (noting that the letters "are retained even today").
CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 295.
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Although the foregoing list does not provide an exhaustive
account of the domestic intelligence activities that were later
disclosed to the public-indeed, there are many more-it provides
a clear and representative picture of the sort of activities that
arose before FISA passed into law. These programs remained
more or less secret until the mid-1970s, but public awareness of
domestic surveillance issues begin to grow in 1970, when
Christopher Pyle revealed that while serving in the Army, he
learned of a military program designed to keep tabs on "politically
suspect" Americans (using some 1,500 plainclothes Army
intelligence agents to monitor all demonstrations in the United
States that involved twenty or more people).45 Senator Sam
Ervin (a Democrat representing North Carolina) began
investigating that program, which allegedly started under
President Johnson; however, uncooperative Army leadership
apparently stymied Ervin's inquiries for more information.4 6
On March 8, 1971, several Vietnam War protesters broke
into an FBI field office in Pennsylvania, in search of proof that
the agency was illegally monitoring left-wing activists. 47 They
stole hundreds of documents, some of which substantiated the
concerns behind their break-in. 48 Over the next several months,
the burglars mailed select documents from the stolen cache to
several journalists, including Betty Medsger at the Washington
Post. 49 The Post then published a series of articles based on the
documents, revealing "how the F.B.I. was spying on political
activists and actively trying to disrupt their activities."50
Then, in 1972, the Watergate scandal broke, generating
45. An Impeachable Offense? Bush Admits Authorizing NSA to Eavesdrop on
Americans Without CourtApproval, DEMOCRACY Now (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter An
Impeachable Offense,
http://www.democracynow.org/2005/12/19/an impeachable
offensebush admits authorizing.
46. See Karl E. Campbell, Senator Sam Ervin and the Army Spy Scandal of 197071: Balancing National Security and Civil Liberties in a Free Society, CHARLOTTECOMMISSION,
http://www.cmhpf.org/
HISTORIC LANDMARKS
MECKLENBURG
Random%20Files/senator%20sam%20ervin.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (describing
the Army cover-up in response to Ervin's inquiries).
47. Bonnie Bertram & Drew Magratten, The FBI File Heist That Changed
History, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.comlarticles/
2014/01/07/the-fbi-file-heist-that-changed-history.html.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see BETTY MEDSGER, THE BURGLARY: THE DISCOVERY OF J. EDGAR
HOOVER'S SECRET FBI (2014).
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widespread media attention. 1 And in 1974, reporting by
Seymour Hersh revealed that the CIA had engaged in (among
other things) widespread domestic surveillance of antiwar groups
and political dissidents during the Nixon Administration. That
program, known as "Operation CHAOS," was discussed in a
series of internal CIA reports, colloquially known as the Family
Jewels." The momentum created by this chain of events, linked
prominently by their temporal proximity, forced concern about
the activities of spy agencies to a critical mass in the Senate. 3
In early 1975, the Senate voted to create the eleven-man"
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with

51. LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE
INVESTIGATION 11 (1985).

52. Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. operation reported in U.S. against antiwar
forces, other dissidents in Nixon years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974; see also U.S.
SENATE, JANUARY 27, 1975 CHURCH COMMITTEE CREATED [hereinafter U.S. SENATE,
CHURCH

COMMITTEE

CREATED],

http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/

(last visited Feb. 3, 2014)
history/minute/ChurchCommitteeCreated.htm
(describing the effect of the Hersh article); JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 9-10 (doing
the same). Some have pointed to other factors that contributed to an environment
conducive to investigations of the intelligence community. These include concerns
among the public about the execution of the Vietnam War and allegations that the
intelligence community had been attempting to destabilize foreign governments.
JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 11.
There were other contemporaneous
53. JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 11.
investigations as well, which were not conducted by the Senate. At the very
beginning of 1975, President Ford created a commission headed by Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller to look specifically at the activities of the CIA. Id. at 10-11.
Many regarded that as an unsuccessful attempt to preempt congressional
investigations that would be less accountable to the executive branch. See id at 10.
The House also established a pair of investigating committees, with Lucien Nedzi
(Democrat of Michigan) serving as the chair of the first. FRANK JOHN SMIST,
CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: 1947-1994, at

137 (2d ed. 1994). When that committee imploded six months into its mandate, the
House created a replacement led by Otis Pike, Democrat of New York. Id. at 152-53.
Yet even Pike's committee fared poorly, receiving criticism for hostility toward the
intelligence community, unprofessionalism, and an inability to protect confidential
information. See generally id. at 153-213. The House voted to allow the executive
branch to censor Pike's final report, and an uncensored version only reached the
public via unauthorized leaks to the press. Id. at 169-71. The entire debacle turned
the House off from intelligence oversight-in contrast to the Senate, which drew on
its reasonably favorable experience with Church to establish a permanent oversight
panel with considerably more stability. Id. at 214. It is for these reasons that I focus
on Church and his committee's findings.
54. All members of the committee-six Democrats and five Republicans-were
male. See JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 14 (providing names and photographs of all
members).
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Respect to Intelligence Activities 65 -now commonly known as the
"Church Committee" for its Chair, Frank Church (a Democrat
from Idaho). 5 6 The Committee took its mandate to center
primarily around "whether intelligence activities threaten 'the
rights of Americans."' It issued a number of reports, with one in
particular detailing most of the activities summarized above (as
well as many more programs left aside for the purposes of this
Article).5' The Church Report roundly condemned the behavior of
intelligence agencies on the whole, finding that:
[T]he targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond
persons who could properly be characterized as enemies of
freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens
engaging in lawful activity.... Unless new and tighter
controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence
activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and
fundamentally alter its nature.5 9
The forceful conclusions of the Church Committee, and the
attendant push for regulation of the surveillance activities of
United States intelligence agencies, led to the passage of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.60
B. THE PASSAGE OF FISA

The scandals that led up to the formation of the Church
Committee, and the revelations contained in the Church Report,
proved sufficient impetus for the creation of a strong legal
framework regulating government surveillance activities.
President Carter signed FISA into law in 1978,61 establishing
legislative guideposts regulating all electronic surveillance of
55. See Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities ("Church Committee"), U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
(last
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/churchcommittee.html
INTELLIGENCE,
visited Feb. 3, 2014).
56. See U.S. SENATE, CHURCH COMMITTEE CREATED, supra note 52 (giving the
full name of the committee).
57.

CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 7.

58. See generally id. (providing the text of what I refer to here as the "Church
Committee Report").
59. Id. at 7.
60. See GLENN GREENWALD, How WOULD A PATRIOT ACT?: DEFENDING
AMERICAN VALUES FROM A PRESIDENT RUN AMOK 24 (2006) (making explicit the link

between the work of the Church Committee and the passage of FISA). The text of
the statute is available at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
61. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 24.
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American citizens or permanent residents within the United
States for foreign intelligence or international counterterrorism
purposes.6 2 Under FISA, the government retains broad powers to
engage in electronic surveillance; however, when eavesdropping
on the domestic or international communications of American
citizens or permanent residents, government officials must
operate under at least a modicum of judicial oversight lest they be
guilty of a felony.63
Specifically, FISA created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC, or FISA court), a "secret" court whose
deliberations take place with only the government present, but
whose approval is necessary for extended surveillance of
Americans." One newspaper has characterized the role of the
FISC as follows: "The court is meant to approve all wiretaps
placed inside America for intelligence-gathering purposes."
The FISC meets at the Justice Department. 6 Its function,
as suggested above, is to evaluate the government's requests for
warrants for conducting surveillance on American citizens and
permanent residents.
FISA directs the FISC to authorize
warrants where there is "probable cause to believe that the target
of surveillance is an agent of a foreign state or a terrorist
group,"6 and the standard of proof appears to be lower than the
standards in typical criminal proceedings. 68 The FISC nearly
always accedes to government requests: "[F]rom 1978 to 2001the year President Bush ordered [the NSA to begin operating
outside of the FISA framework]-the government submitted a
total of 13,102

requests

to the . .. court

to eavesdrop

on

Americans." The court requested modifications to just two of
these requests, and ultimately approved them all.6 9
62. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 24, 26.
63. See id at 25-26. FISA caps the penalty for violations at $10,000 in fines and
five years in prison. Id. at 26 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1809(c)).
64. See Philip Shenon, Secret Court Says F.B.L Aides Misled Judges in 75 Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/23/us/secret-court-saysfbi-aides-misled-judges-in-75-cases.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the court
generally operates in secret).
65. Hess, supra note 10.
66. Risen & Lichtblau, supranote 4.
67. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 26 (citing 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (2008)).
68. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4.
69. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 28. The Electronic Privacy Information Center
has extracted similar statistics from what appear to be the same source: reports
compiled by the Federation of American Scientists. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
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Though the FISC can grant emergency surveillance approval
within a matter of hours, 70 FISA also recognized the possibility
that urgent circumstances might require the government to begin
surveillance before there is time to secure the permission of the
FISC. Thus, FISA at one point permitted the government to
conduct surveillance of Americans for up to seventy-two hours
without a warrant.n (That period has since been extended to 168
hours.)7 2 In times of war, the warrantless provision becomes even
more generous, permitting the government to engage in
surveillance
(related
to
gathering
foreign
intelligence
information) for up to fifteen days before securing permission
from the FISC. 7 3
These provisions were intended to make it possible for the
government to continue conducting surveillance as needed for the
purposes of protecting national security. At the same time, by
introducing some measure of judicial review, the law had the
potential to screen out the use of intelligence agencies for purely
political purposes, a rampant problem under previous
administrations 74 that arguably reached its apex in Watergate.
To achieve this purpose, FISA built in stringent criminal
penalties for anyone who violated its terms: under § 1809, the law
mandates up to five years in prison and $10,000 in fines for any
official who "engages in electronic surveillance under color of law
except as authorized [under FISA]."6
The fact that FISA emerged during the Cold War-a crisis
that was plausibly of substantially greater proportions than the
one the United States faces presently in terrorism-may be
significant, at least for interpreting what sorts of countervailing
FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE

SURVEILLANCE

ACT

COURT

ORDERS

1979-2011,

http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html(last updated May 4, 2012).
According to their statistics, between 1970 and 2011, there were only eleven rejected
FISA applications out of thousands submitted (with all of the rejections occurring in
2003 or later). ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT COURT ORDERS 1979-2011, http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisastats.html
(last updated May 4, 2012).
70. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4.
71. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(f).
72. See 50 U.S.C.S. § 1881a(g)(1)(B) (2008) (codifying the shift to seven days).
73. Id.

74. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37, 45-52 (describing some of the more
striking examples of politically-motivated surveillance in the U.S. during the 20th
century).
75. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(c).
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considerations (if any) the legislators behind the law would have
accepted as trumping its provisions."6 As Glenn Greenwald has
pointed out: "In the year FISA was enacted, the Soviet empire
had multiple nuclear warheads aimed at scores of American
Given the context and FISA's explicit wartime
cities."n
provisions, it does not appear that the existence of threats from
foreign powers or terrorist groups would, alone, suffice to justify
bypassing the law.
II. TRACING THE ARC OF THE NSA PROGRAM
A. REVELATION OF THE NSA PROGRAM7 9
The NSA program has evolved since its inception, as has
what we know about it. Many of the details are difficult to
ascertain because of the secret nature of the program and
discrepancies in what has been reported, including the conflicting
accounts given by whistleblowers and active, high-ranking
government officials. We can begin by laying out what is
presently known about the NSA program and describing updates
to the domestic legal framework since 9/11.
There is a bit of ambiguity about when the program began.

76. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 26-27 (discussing the political and national
security context at the time of FISA's passage and comparing that to more recent
circumstances).
77. Id. at 26.
78. See id. at 26-28 (implying the same conclusion by noting that Congress chose
to include judicial oversight requirements on FISA-regulated surveillance practices
notwithstanding the magnitude of the national security threat posed at the time by
the Soviet Union).
79. Throughout this Article, I will use the term "NSA program" to refer broadly to
the expanded surveillance activities of the NSA that have been disclosed in the wake
of 9/11, beginning with warrantless surveillance of domestic-to-foreign
communications in (at least) late 2001. The program has, at various points, publicly
been referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" (or TSP), as well (internally
at the NSA) as Operation Stellar Wind. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, NSA's Domestic
Spying Grows As Agency Sweeps Up Data, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2008, 12:01 AM)
[hereinafter Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying], http://online.wsj.com/public/
article/SB120511973377523845.html?mod=blog (giving the former name); James
Bamford, The NSA Is Building The Country's Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You
Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM) [hereinafter Bamford, NSA Spy Center],
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ffnsadatacenter/all/1 (using the latter
name). For simplicity, I will avoid both of these names. At the same time, different
parts of what I refer to as the "NSA program" appear to fall into discrete programs
under the NSA's own internal classification (such as PRISM, Boundless Informant,
and so on) and thus my use of the term is not felicitous in a formal sense.
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According to some sources, President Bush signed the executive
order that authorized the program in 2002,80 but the program
itself appears to have started days after the attacks on September
11, 2001.81 One explanation for this timing discrepancy appears
in a 2008 Wall Street Journal article, according to which the NSA
may originally have implemented the program by relying on an
outstanding executive order from the early 1980s before receiving
an updated authorization order from President Bush in 2002.82
In any case, the first public report of the program appeared
on the front page of the New York Times on December 16, 2005.83
The Times reported that the NSA had begun eavesdropping on
people within the United States-some of them Americanswithout warrants and that the NSA had derived its authority to
begin this program under an order signed by President Bush in
2002.84 According to the Times, up to 500 people within the
United States (and 5,000 to 7,000 abroad) were subject to
warrantless surveillance at any given point, though the total
number of people who had been affected by the program over its
life was substantially larger because the list of targets changed
over time.15 Both phone calls and email were targeted under the
program, though the aim was to pursue only calls and emails
with at least one point of contact (origination or termination)

80. See, e.g., Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4 (providing this information); Dan
Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR2005121600021
.html (doing the same).
81. Eggen, supra note 80 (noting an official's comments that "[tihe
effort ... began days after the [9/11] attacks"); see also Leslie Cauley, NSA has
massive databaseof Americans' phone calls, USA TODAY (May 11, 2006, 10:38 AM)
("The
NSA's
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05- 10-nsax.htm
domestic program began soon after the Sept. 11 attacks . . . .").
82. See Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79 ("In response to the Sept.
11 attacks, then NSA-chief Gen. Michael Hayden has said he used his authority to
expand the NSA's capabilities under a 1981 executive order governing the agency.
Another presidential order issued shortly after the attacks, the text of which is
classified, opened the door for the NSA to incorporate more domestic data in its
searches, one senior intelligence official said.").
83. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4 (the article itself). Later reporting
suggests that the original leak to the Times began with a Republican lawyer from the
Justice Department named Thomas Tamm. See Joe Conason, A whistle-blower who
needs Obama and Holder's protection, SALON (Apr. 17, 2009, 5:39 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2009/04/17/whistleblower_2/.
84. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4.
85. Id.
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abroad.8 6
The Times reported that the program began to accelerate in
2002, when the CIA started to detain greater numbers of
terrorism suspects. 7
The government sought to begin
surveillance immediately on individuals who were linked in some
way to these suspects-for instance, individuals whose contact
information appeared in the suspects' phones or computers.8 8
Even as of 2005, however, during initial reporting on the
program, the Times noted that the government still required
FISC warrants for monitoring purely domestic communications
(as opposed to communications between someone within the
United States and someone abroad)."
The initial report also noted that the program may have
undergone changes in the middle of 2004, when federal judge
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (the federal judge who oversaw the FISC
at the time) complained that the government might be misusing
information gathered without warrants."0 The details of the
complaint have not been reported publicly, but the idea appears
to be that the government was bootstrapping its way to warrant
requests before the FISC by relying in those requests on
information gathered via warrantless NSA surveillance-a
practice
that Judge
Kollar-Kotelly
appeared to find
unacceptable. 9 ' Resulting changes included the first audit of the
program by the Justice Department, as well as the department's
development of a more detailed checklist for identifying whether
the NSA should undertake surveillance of particular targets.92
These are the key facts that the public confronted in its first
brush with the NSA program. Yet there is a legitimate question
as to what exactly prompted the government to begin the
program in the first place. Because the secret order by President
Bush that authorized the program was promulgated in 2002 and
the program is thought to have started shortly after the 9/11
attacks, it is natural to think of those attacks as the catalyst

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4.
Id.
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Indeed, some
behind the introduction of the program. 9 3
government officials have said that the expanded surveillance
only began after the attacks, 9 4 and one common name for the
program is the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" (TSP). 5
But there is some indication that the NSA began expanding
its surveillance activities (or at least laying the groundwork to do
so) months before 9/11. According to Joseph Nacchio, the former
CEO of Qwest Communications, the NSA began applying
pressure on Qwest in February of 2001 to secure its cooperation
in a surveillance program that Qwest's lawyers regarded as
illegal.9 6 It may be worth noting that these accusations came out
as Nacchio fought (ultimately unsuccessfully) against charges of
insider trading; however, Nacchio's defense team supported its
claims by pointing out similar allegations in an earlier lawsuit.97
These allegations suggested that about seven months before the
9/11 attacks, AT&T had begun preparing a facility specifically for
the NSA to use in gaining access to the phone and Internet
information on AT&T's network.98 Additional details, however,
remain difficult to ascertain.
Leaving aside difficult questions about the months directly
leading up to 9/11, we can piece together a few important facts
based on what had been reported before the program was
93. See, e.g., Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4 (linking the program to 9/11).
94. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Former Phone Chief Says Spy Agency Sought
Surveillance
Help
Before
9/11,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
14,
2007,
(noting
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/business/14qwest.html?ref=todayspaper
that multiple government officials have said the warrantless wiretapping only
started after 9/11, under an order from President Bush); James Bamford, The NSA is
still listening to you, SALON (July 22, 2009, 5:19 AM) [hereinafter Bamford, NSA is
listening], http://www.salon.com/2009/07/22/eavesdropping_2/ (claiming that the
"administration's decision to open the NSA's surveillance floodgates [came] following
the 9/11 attacks").
95. See Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79 (referring to the program
as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program). This is the name used to describe the
original instantiation of the program, which (without warrants) collected calls and
emails between domestic and international parties. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (using the abbreviation
"TSP' to refer to the program in its original form).
96. Shane, supra note 94.
97. Id.; see also Andrew Harris, Spy Agency Sought U.S. Call Records Before
9/11, Lawyers Say, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2006, 6:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
the
same
(advancing
comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ablVcO64zJE
allegations regarding AT&T's alleged involvement in the NSA's surveillance
program).
98. Shane, supra note 94.
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disclosed and what was reported in the New York Times's
December 16, 2005 bombshell. For one, we know that after the
9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration began to push publicly for
expanded powers to fight terrorism. 99 One result-signed into
law mere weeks after the attacks, on October 26-was the
Uniting (and) Strengthening America (by) Providing Appropriate
Tools Required (to) Intercept (and) Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (the USA PATRIOT Act).100
The USA PATRIOT Act, among many other things, explicitly
revised FISA to make it easier for the government to conduct
surveillance under the FISA framework.101 It amended FISA in
several key ways, including allowing for "roving" warrants that
applied to all phones used by a particular target rather than to
specific phone numbers 10 2 and permitting intelligence agencies to
share among themselves the information that they secured
through such eavesdropping. 103
Several commentators have observed that while the Bush
Administration was publicly pushing for the USA PATRIOT Act,
in part with the aim of easing FISA's requirements, it
simultaneously and secretly initiated the NSA program, which
ignored that framework altogether.104
Whatever its legal
significance, this was clearly a deliberate approach by the Bush
Administration, inasmuch as President Bush publicly declared
the USA PATRIOT Act's FISA modifications sufficient for
fighting terrorism."o'
B. A SUMMARY OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING
THE NSA PROGRAM

Following the initial disclosure of the NSA program on
December 16, 2005, a general pattern began to emerge in
subsequent reporting: periodically, articles would appear in
various media outlets indicating that the NSA program was
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
Risen

E.g., GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 12.
USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
Id.
Id. § 206.
Id. § 203.
See GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 14 (observing this feature of the timing);
& Lichtblau, supra note 4 (doing the same).
105. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 13 (alleging this after President Bush noted
"[tihis new law ... will allow surveillance of all communications used by
terrorists . . .").
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actually larger than originally disclosed."'o As of the writing of
this Article, that pattern had continued to grow stronger as a
result of the ongoing publication of leaks from Edward
Snowden.107 While those trends may be a function of more
information about the program simply leaking out over time, they
could also reflect the expanding nature of the program, the latter
being consistent with strong patterns in spying activities
uncovered by the Church Committee.1 0 8
Just five days after running its first article on the program,
the Times followed up with a report that some purely domestic
calls had been intercepted because of a technical "glitch."' 09 More
specifically, some calls between two parties in the United States
had apparently been intercepted when the NSA mistakenly
concluded that one of the parties to the call happened to be
located abroad. 10
The joint effect of these first NSA articles was to spur a
flurry of activity in Congress in early 2006, as various legislative
branch officials sought to placate concerned constituents by
learning more about the program while simultaneously toeing the
executive branch's aggressive line on preserving secrecy around
Much of the
the government's counterterrorism efforts."'
resistance in Congress ultimately led nowhere in the face of

106. See Cauley, supra note 81 (showing this trend); Gorman, NSA's Domestic
Spying, supra note 79 (the same); see also infra text accompanying notes 109, 157,
163, and 202-237 (the same).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 109-118, 130-138, and 157-237
(documenting this pattern).
108. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 9 ("The tendency of
intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs
through every aspect of our investigative findings.").
109. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005 [hereinafter Risen & Lichtblau, Spying Program],
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/21nsa.html?ex=1292821200&en=91d434
31lbOa7ddc&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0 (first reporting these facts).
110. Id. Note that General Hayden's quote on the matter seemed to contradict the
Times story directly: 'The authorization given to N.S.A. by the president requires
that one end of these communications has to be outside the United States,' General
Hayden answered. 'I can assure you, by the physics of the intercept, by how we
actually conduct our activities, that one end of these communications are always
outside the United States."' Id.
111. See generally Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, The NSA Domestic
Surveillance Program:An Analysis of CongressionalOversight During an Era of OneParty Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149 (2006) (describing the oversight climate in
Congress as it first publicly confronted the NSA program).
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strong pressure from the Bush administration. 112
On April 7, 2006, Wired Magazine published the public
statement of Mark Klein, who had spent over twenty-two years as
a technician with AT&T. 11 3 Klein alleged that AT&T had
cooperated with the NSA in creating "splitter cabinets" that
would allow for the monitoring of all Internet and phone traffic
routed through facilities in several major American cities. 1 14 One
month later, in May of 2006, USA TODAY reported that the NSA
program was actually much larger than previously acknowledged
by the government, as AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth (with 200
million customers among them) had been working under contract
with the NSA to provide an enormous amount of transactional
data about the domestic phone call patterns of American
citizens.1 15 As the article put it, the "government has detailed
records
of calls... made
[by
customers
of
these
telecommunication companies]-across town or across the
country-to family members, co-workers, business contacts and
others."1 1 6
The information turned over by the telecom companies
apparently omitted certain personal details about the callersnames, addresses, and the like-but the article noted that the
NSA has the power to locate that information with ease, simply
by cross-checking the phone numbers against other information
in its possession."' The authors also quoted an anonymous
source as saying that the program involved "the largest database
ever assembled in the world," and they noted that previous
assurances by President Bush that the NSA was focusing on
foreign calls misleadingly suggested to Americans that their
domestic calling information was secure.118

112. See Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 111, at 166 (noting that congressional
oversight was, on the whole, ineffective).
113. See generally Wiretap Whistle-Blower's Account: Statement of Mark Klein,
WIRED, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/7062 1.
114. See id. (providing Klein's explicit allegations). Klein subsequently provided
evidence for a lawsuit over the NSA program, undertaken by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.
See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., NSA Spying on Americans,
https://www.eff.org/issues/nsa-spying/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (noting Klein's
participation in the suit).
115. Cauley, supra note 81.
116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Id.
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In late July of 2007, claiming that "[o]ur national security
depend[ed] on it," President Bush used a radio address to call for
further revision or modernization of FISA.11 9 He highlighted four
changes to the FISA framework contained in a bill pending before
Congress, 120 and he called for the bill's passage.1 21 Congress
obliged,122 and on August 5, 2007, President Bush signed into law
the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA).1 2 3 The PAA granted the
government the power to collect foreign communications that
"pass through communication nodes on U.S. soil."124 More
controversially, the PAA was designed to make it easier to
conduct surveillance all around, in part by reducing the role of
the FISC to approving target selection parameters in general
rather than actually authorizing particular surveillance via
warrants.125 Under the PAA, the latter authority was vested in
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence,
who were empowered to issue yearlong warrants for the
surveillance of people reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States.126 The law left it unclear how to handle

119. See President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (July 28, 2007),
available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/
print/20070728.html(providing text of the address).
120. Id. ("First, it brings FISA up to date with the changes in communications
technology that have taken place over the past three decades. Second, it seeks to
restore FISA to its original focus on protecting the privacy interests of people inside
the United States, so we don't have to obtain court orders to effectively collect foreign
intelligence about foreign targets located in foreign locations. Third, it allows the
government to work more efficiently with private-sector entities like communications
providers, whose help is essential. And fourth, it will streamline administrative
processes so our intelligence community can gather foreign intelligence more quickly
and more effectively, while protecting civil liberties.")
121. See id. ("Our intelligence community warns that under the current statute,
we are missing a significant amount of foreign intelligence that we should be
collecting to protect our country. Congress needs to act immediately to pass this bill,
so that our national security professionals can close intelligence gaps and provide
critical warning time for our country.").
122. See Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 11 (describing Congress's cooperation).
123. Juan P. Valdivieso, Recent Developments, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 581, 581
(2008), available at http://www3.law.harvard.eduljournals/jol/files/2013/10/581600_Valdivieso-2008.pdf.
124. Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 11.
125. See id. ("Oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ... would
be limited to examining whether the government's guidelines for targeting overseas
suspects are appropriate.").
126. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, HUMAN RTS. WATCH,
COMMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 5 (2013) [hereinafter COMMENTS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related material]
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incidental foreign communications (with one party located in the
United States) that were captured in pursuing the targets of
those long-term warrants.1 2 7 Advocates praised the law for
enabling the government to gather communications about its
targets irrespective of where those communications originate.12 8
Opposition to the bill from Democratic lawmakers managed to
secure a single concession: a six-month sunset provision, which
came into effect in early 2008, ending the PAA.1 2 9
On March 10, 2008, shortly after the PAA expired, Siobhan
Gorman at the Wall Street Journal reported that NSA
surveillance was broader still than previous disclosures had
indicated, noting that "efforts [by the NSA to gather surveillance
domestically] have evolved to reach more broadly into data about
people's communications, travel and finances in the U.S. than the
domestic surveillance programs brought to light since the 2001
terrorist attacks."'s Gorman detailed the NSA's activities as
relayed to her by "two former officials familiar with the datasifting efforts."131 They described the following operation:
[The officials] work by starting with some sort of lead, like a
phone number or Internet address. In partnership with the
FBI, the systems then can track all domestic and foreign
transactions of people associated with that item -- and then
the people who associated with them, and so on, casting a
gradually wider net.'32
Citing an intelligence official, Gorman went on to provide an
example of how the program could manifest:
If a person suspected of terrorist connections is believed to be
in a U.S. city -- for instance, Detroit, a community with a
high concentration of Muslim Americans -- the government's

spy systems may be directed to collect and analyze all
Comment%20HRW%20PCLOB%2OFinal%208-1-13_0.pdf.
127. See ACLU Fact Sheet on the "PoliceAmerica Act," AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-fact-sheet-%E2%80%9C
police-america-act (documenting some concerns). The ACLU harshly criticized the
law, referring to it as the "Police America Act" in a fact sheet it released two days
after the PAA became law. Id.
128. Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 11.
129. See id.
130. Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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electronic communications into and out of the city.
The haul can include records of phone calls, email headers
and destinations, data on financial transactions and records
of Internet browsing.
The system also would collect
information about other people, including those in the U.S.,
who communicated with people in Detroit.
The information doesn't generally include the contents of
conversations or emails. But it can give such transactional
information as a cellphone's location, whom a person is
calling, and what Web sites he or she is visiting. For an
email, the data haul can include the identities of the sender
and recipient and the subject line, but not the content of the
message. 133
Gorman reported that the legal argument for the
permissibility of such a program hinges on the government's
interpretation of a Supreme Court case from 1979, which allowed
for the warrantless collection of phone call records. 13 4 While
Gorman pointed out that several laws require court orders for
transactional data, she also noted that the USA PATRIOT Act
has generally made it easier to get such information.13 5
Additionally, Gorman claimed that the NSA gains access to
transactional data through the FBI, using "telecommunications
hubs" like the one that caused former AT&T official Mark Klein
to come forward with information in 2006.136 Gorman noted that,
in the Electronic Frontier Foundation lawsuit launched in
connection with Klein's disclosures, "a former technology adviser
to the Federal Communications Commission" speculated that
there could be as many as twenty such stations around the
United States.13 1 Moreover, according to Gorman, "[c]urrent and
former intelligence officials confirmed a domestic network of
hubs, but didn't know the number."1 38
133. Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79.
134. Id. The article does not identify the relevant case, but it appears to be Smith
v. Maryland. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the
use of "pen registers," installed on telephone company property with the aim of
recording phone numbers dialed by customers, did not require a warrant because
callers automatically turn over their calling records to the phone company and thus
lose their expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial).
135. Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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On July 10, 2008, President Bush signed into law the final
major amendment to the FISA framework. 139 The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008
(FISA Amendments Act, or FAA) stood in for the 2007 PAA,
which had expired in February as a result of its six-month sunset
provision. 140 One major provision, which garnered substantial
press coverage in the weeks leading up to the passage of the FAA,
extended retroactive immunity to telecom companies that had
been assisting the NSA in collecting data without the
involvement of the FISC. 14 1 The effect of that provision was to
head off almost four-dozen pending lawsuits against telecoms for
their involvement in surveillance that violated FISA. 142
The law ostensibly imposed several surveillance restrictions
that were missing under the PAA (though as Glenn Greenwald
has pointed out, the February 2008 expiration of the PAA meant
that in the interim, until the FAA became law, the applicable law
simply reverted back to the original FISA framework as modified
largely through the USA PATRIOT Act). 143 First, under the FAA,
the FISC has the exclusive authority to issue warrants for
targeted surveillance of Americans overseas based on some
degree of probable cause-a power that the PAA had
controversially granted to the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence. 144 (The FAA requires FISC warrants for
targeting Americans abroad.)14' The law also requires annual
139. It is final as of February 2014, though future changes remain possible.
140. Glenn Greenwald, Obama's new statement on FISA, UNCLAIMED TERRITORY
BLOG
(July 3,
2008)
[hereinafter
Greenwald,
Obama on
FISA],
http://utdocuments.blogspot.com.br/2008/07/obamas-new-statement-on-fisa.html. The
FAA was renewed at the end of 2012, so it remains applicable today, though it is set
to expire again, barring renewal, in 2017.
Obama Signs FISA Warrantless
Wiretapping Program Extension Into Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2012, 5:49
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/30/obama-fisa-warrantless-wiretapping
_n_2385690.html.
141. See, e.g., Kit Bond, FISA Amendments Act of 2008, WALL ST. J. (June 19,
2008, 6:24 PM), http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB121391360949290049.html (noting
this liability protection extends up until "the President's Terrorist Surveillance
Program was brought under the FISA Court"; Hess, supra note 10; Paul Kane, House
Passes Spy Bill; Senate Expected to Follow, WASH. PoST, June 21, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/06/20/ST2008062001087.h
tml (noting that immunity depends on showing "written assurance from the Bush
administration that the spying was legal").
142. Hess, supra note 10.
143. Greenwald, Obama on FISA, supra note 140.
144. COMMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 126; Hess, supranote 10.
145. Hess, supra note 10.
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submissions from the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to the FISC, detailing the government's
surveillance targeting provisions and seeking the court's approval
for those provisions applicable to the targeting of foreigners
outside the United States.146
The FAA also reconfirms the FISA framework as the
exclusive means for engaging in domestic wiretapping for
intelligence purposes,' 4 7 though that is not necessarily a useful
provision. For one, the previous FISA framework, with its
original exclusivity provision, came back into effect in February
2008.148 Moreover, the breadth of the FAA may obviate the
purported need for the NSA to work outside the law. 149
More controversially, the law gave the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General joint power to grant broad,
yearlong warrants for targeting foreign people or groups.150 This
provision raised major concerns among critics. One was that
Americans suspected of no wrongdoing, and for whose
communications no warrants had been granted, would have their
correspondence swept up incidentally in broad investigations of
"true" targets.'
The other major concern was that the FISC
retained too small a role in overseeing the targeting of
foreigners.1 52 As with the PAA, under the FAA the FISC does not
issue warrants with respect to correspondents believed by
intelligence officials to be both non-American and outside the
United States; instead, the statute limits the role of the court to
reviewing the targeting and minimization procedures that the
146, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1881a (2008).
147. Bond, supra note 141; Hess, supra note 10.
148. Greenwald, Obama on FISA, supra note 140.
149. See Marty Lederman, The Key Questions About the New FISA Bill,
BALKINIZATION (June 22, 2008, 8:27 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/keyquestions-about-new-fisa-bill.html (expressing the idea that the law might be so
permissive as to render extra-legal operations of the NSA unnecessary).
150. See COMMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 126 (summarizing key
provisions of the FAA),
151. See, e.g., ACLU Letter, supra note 3, at 2 (expressing this concern where the
real target is abroad but an American is "on the other end of those communications").
According to former Department of Justice lawyer David Kris, this is indeed the way
the government has interpreted the FAA. Lederman, supra note 141 (interviewing
David Kris). This is a point we will return to below. See infra text accompanying
notes 211-218.
152. See, e.g., COMMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 126 (expressing
precisely this concern).
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Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence use to
select targets falling within that category.153
The FAA also expanded the "emergency," pre-warrant
surveillance window (from 72 to 168 hours, or one week),1 54 and it
created a large exigency loophole that permits common use of the
pre-warrant provision. 5 5
Finally, the law empowers the
government to continue surveillance of targets even if the FISC
rejects the applications submitted for those targets; such
"unauthorized" surveillance can continue for as long as sixty days
during the FISC appeals process.1 5 6
Several meaningful reports about the scope of the program
followed the passage of the FAA. In April of 2009, the New York
Times revealed that the NSA had "intercepted private e-mail
messages and phone calls of Americans in recent months on a
scale that went beyond the broad legal limits established by
Congress [in the FAA] . . . ."'65 The Times suggested that the
problem became apparent during the FAA certification process
described above, which requires the Attorney General and
Director of National Intelligence to submit surveillance protocols
for approval by the FISC.15 8 The Times also suggested that the
over-collection of data may have been unintentional, at least in
part the result of difficulties in distinguishing "between
communications inside the United States and those overseas as
[the NSA] uses its access to American telecommunication
companies' fiber-optic lines and its own spy satellites to intercept
millions of calls and e-mail messages."15 9 Additionally, the article
noted independent allegations of misconduct leveled against the
NSA by a senior FBI agent, whose information suggested that the
NSA might be targeting Americans for surveillance based on
153. See ACLU Letter, supra note 3, at 3 (summarizing these concerns).
154. Hess, supra note 10.
155. ACLU Letter, supra note 3, at 4. "The bill permits the government to start a
spying program and wait to go to court for up to 7 days every time 'intelligence
important to national security of the US may be lost or not timely acquired."' Id. As
the letter notes, all court applications take some time, and under the language
provided, it is unclear if "even a 30 minute delay" could be deemed as "impeding
'timely' acquisition." Id.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html?
pagewanted=1&_r=0.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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insufficient evidence of their ties to terrorism. 16 0 In one instance,
the NSA had apparently attempted-without a warrant-to
listen in on the conversations of a congressman during a 2005 or
2006 trip to the Middle East (though the Times claimed that the
proposal to do so was ultimately rejected).16 '
In June of 2009, the Times followed up again. 162 It reported
that the government claimed to have corrected the problems
identified in the paper's April article, but that more information
had surfaced about the possibility that the NSA had, since at
least 2005, been examining large volumes of Americans' emails
without warrants.163 More specifically, the Times claimed that
the NSA had overstepped its FISC authorization in eight to ten
different court orders, which could have resulted in millions of
improperly collected individual communications.1 6 4 According to
the Times, the FAA was passed partly to ease the NSA's task in
collecting email correspondence, but the NSA had been using a
large email database called "Pinwale" since at least 2005,
accessing Americans' emails (without warrants) in the process. 6 5
The Times quoted a former NSA analyst as saying that "Pinwale
allowed N.S.A. analysts to read large volumes of e-mail messages
to and from Americans as long as they fell within certain limitsno more than thirty percent of any database search, he recalled
being told-and Americans were not explicitly singled out in the
searches."' 6 6
In 2010, the Washington Post reported further on the scope
of the program, claiming that each day the NSA would "intercept
and store 1.7 billion e-mails, phone calls and other types of
communications."1 67 According to the Post, one result of the
massive scale of that program was that the government was
struggling with the logistical challenges of managing so much

160. Lichtblau & James Risen, supra note 157.
161. Id. ("The official said the plan was ultimately blocked because of concerns
from some intelligence officials . . . .").
162. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mail Surveillance Renews Concerns in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, [hereinafter Risen & Lichtblau, E-Mail
Surveillance], http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/us/17nsa.html?pagewanted=all&
r=0.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Priest & Arkin, supra note 1.
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data; the NSA program alone required the agency to feed its data
into seventy different databases.16
Then, in March of 2012, James Bamford published an article
in Wired Magazine about the NSA's construction of a massive
data storage facility in Bluffdale, Utah. 6 9 His report included
schematics for the compound and described the groundbreaking
ceremony for the project, which occurred in early 2011.170 The
compound is expected to house, among other things, a "1-millionsquare-foot data storehouse" capable of storing the digital
equivalent of 500 quintillion pages of text."
For his 2012 article, Bamford also spoke on the record for the
first time with an NSA "crypto-mathematician" named James
Binney. Binney had worked at the NSA for nearly forty years
and had been deeply involved in setting up parts of its
surveillance apparatus. 172 However, he resigned in 2001-shortly
after warrantless wiretapping began-because he believed the
program to violate the Constitution.173
Binney claimed that the NSA had placed its telecom
wiretapping switches so as to gain access to domestic
communications when it was physically possible to place the
switches differently and thereby restrict access solely to foreign
communications.1 7 4 He also claimed that the NSA program,
codenamed "Stellar Wind," involved the inspection of both
17
domestic phone calls and domestic emails."
Days later, the
director of the NSA, General Keith Alexander, testified before
Congress; in response to questions that were based on revelations
in Bamford's article, Alexander denied that the agency has the

168. Priest & Arkin, supra note 1.
169. See Bamford, NSA Spy Center,supra note 79 (giving a detailed account of the
project). Bamford first reported on plans to build the Utah Data Center for Salon in
July of 2009. Bamford, NSA is listening, supra note 94 (containing Bamford's earlier
reporting on the project).
170. See Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
171. Id. In numerical form, "500 quintillion" appears as a five followed by twenty
zeroes (500,000,000,000,000,000,000). Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (explaining that the agency could simply have placed its stations where
the fiber-optic cables come ashore, rather than at "key junction points throughout the
country").
175. Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
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capacity to record purely domestic calls or emails.17 6
posted a rejoinder the following day. 177

Bamford

Binney claimed that the program initially recorded about
320 million calls per day and that it only got larger from there;
with the participation of major telecoms like AT&T and Verizon,
Binney said the program was gathering over 1.5 billion calls per
day.17 Between 2001 and 2012, he estimated that the NSA had
gathered fifteen to twenty trillion communications.' 7 9 He also
claimed that NSA's taps, located in various secret rooms around
the country, can scan Internet traffic based on remote directions
issued from the NSA's headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. 180
Those taps utilize software that can search "for target addresses,
locations, countries, and phone numbers, as well as watch-listed
names, keywords, and phrases in email."'8 1 As Bamford put it:
"Any communication that arouses suspicion, especially those to or
from the million or so people on agency watch lists, are
automatically copied or recorded and then transmitted to the
NSA." 182 Additionally, Binney also confirmed "that the NSA
gained warrantless access to AT&T's vast trove of domestic and
international billing records."183
Binney claims to have suggested a system for monitoring
communications that would have correlated the degree of
176. See Andy Greenberg, NSA Chief Denies Wired's Domestic Spying Story
(Fourteen Times) in CongressionalHearing,FORBES (Mar. 20, 2012, 8:31 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/20/nsa-chief-denies-wiredsdomesticspy
Alexander's
(describing
ing-story-fourteen-times-in-congressional-hearing/
testimony). The next day, Bamford responded, suggesting that the NSA often issues
denials that employ a technical definition of common words: for example, the NSA
can deny that it intercepts certain communications in cases where the layperson
might disagree because '[i]ntercept,' in NSA's lexicon, only takes place when the
communications are 'processed' 'into an intelligible form intended for human
inspection,' not as they pass through NSA listening posts and [are] transferred to
James Bamford, NSA Chief Denies Domestic Spying But
data warehouses."
Whistleblowers Say Otherwise, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2012, 2:37 PM) [hereinafter
Whistleblowers], http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/nsa-whistle
Bamford,
blower/all/.
177. See Bamford, Whistleblowers, supra note 176 (offering Bamford's response to
Alexander).
178. Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
179. Id.
180. Id.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
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scrutiny of a given person with proximity to the target. 184 Thus,
as the degrees of separation between the NSA's target and
another person increased, the amount of information about that
person that would be captured would decrease.1 85 But Binney
said that the NSA rejected his suggestion at the time, and now
the agency may simply be collecting everything it can.1"'
Moreover, Binney told Bamford that the agency could chart a
person's activities on a graph, even including information about
that person's financial transactions and travel plans.1 8 7 He also
claimed that the NSA can eavesdrop on and record calls in real
time, an allegation corroborated by another one of Bamford's
sources, former NSA voice interceptor Adrienne Kinne. "
Coverage of the NSA story subsided substantially for the
next year, but in the summer of 2013, further disclosures about
the surveillance program once again prompted increased media
coverage. On June 5, 2013, The Guardian reported that it had
obtained a copy of an April 2013 order by the FISC in which the
court ordered Verizon to turn over records pertaining to all of the
calls in its systems on a daily basis for a three-month period.189
For students of the NSA story, the revelation was unsurprising:
public reports dating back at least to 2006 had confirmed
Verizon's cooperation with the NSA's domestic surveillance
activities,19 0 and the 2013 order provides the government with
the same sorts of transactional data that the Wall Street Journal
highlighted in some of its 2008 reporting on the surveillance
program. 191 The new reporting nevertheless confirmed that
"[u]nder the terms of the blanket order, the numbers of both
parties on a call are handed over, as are location data, call
duration, unique identifiers, and the time and duration of all
calls."192 According to The Guardian, "[t]he contents of the
conversation itself are not covered." 193
This first new report by The Guardian did not reveal
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Cauley, supra note 81.
See Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79.
Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records, supra note 2.
Id.
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changes to the program beyond what was known before, and it
was unable to confirm whether other telecommunication
companies have been directed to cooperate under similar orders
or whether identical orders were issued on a rolling basis every
three months. 194 The Guardian article did, however, state that
the domestic legal authority for this part of the program came
from the "business records" provision of the USA PATRIOT Act,
and the report provided strong confirmation that the NSA
program has continued on a large scale under the Obama
Administration.1'
Indeed, shortly thereafter, The Guardian
reported on claims by Michael Hayden-NSA Director under
President Bush-that the agency's surveillance activities had
continued to expand under the Obama Administration. "
Within a matter of days, Edward Snowden came forward as
the source of the documents underlying The Guardian's
reporting."' A twenty-nine-year-old former contractor who had
spent the preceding four years working with the NSA, Snowden
claimed to have been disturbed by the breadth of NSA
surveillance and motivated by a desire to reveal more information
about the program for the benefit of the public. 198 A number of
subsequent reports appeared, many focused on Snowden
himself,'99 as well as his efforts to seek asylum.2 00 As of
194. Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records, supra note 2. In July, the FISC
renewed the Verizon order. Lara Jakes, FISA Court Approves Continued U.S. Phone
PM),
(July
19,
2013,
6:13
HUFFINGTON
POST
Surveillance,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/fisa-court-approves-surveillance-n_36256
1O.html.
195. Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records, supra note 2.
196. Paul Lewis et al., US surveillance has 'expanded' under Obama, says Bush's
NSA director, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/09/us-surveillance-expanded-obama-hayden.
197. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA
surveillance revelations, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden comes forward as source of
NSA leaks, WASH. POST, June 9, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/intelligence-leaders-push-back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d22-11
e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html; Lana Lam, Whistle-blower Edward Snowden talks
to South China Morning Post, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 13, 2013, 8:51 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1259335/exclusive-whistle-blower-edwa
rd-snowden-talks-south-china-morning?page=all; Mark Mazzetti & Michael S.
Schmidt, Ex-Worker at CIA Says He Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June
9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leakedsurveillance-data.html?hp&_r=1&.
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asylum.201

The media also published a number of subsequent stories
about the NSA's surveillance activities, many of them based on
documents leaked by Snowden. First, The Guardianreported on
an NSA sub-program called "PRISM." 202
Citing secret,
authenticated documents from within the NSA, The Guardian
reported that PRISM ostensibly allows the NSA to gain direct
access to 'emails, chat conversations, voice calls, documents and
more. . . from the servers of ... Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, [and] Apple.'" 203 All of
the companies implicated in the program denied any knowledge
that the government had direct access to their servers and
insisted that they only turn over information to the government
in the face of legitimate, specific requests to do so. 204
The Guardian subsequently reported that the NSA has paid
millions of dollars to the companies involved in PRISM to cover
the costs of compliance with the program.2 0 5 The authority for
the PRISM program appears to derive from the FAA, under a
provision for the deliberate targeting of communications from
"foreign nationals believed to be not on U.S. soil." 206 According to
The Guardian, "Snowden's revelations have shown that US
emails and calls are collected in large quantities . .. either

deliberately because the individual has been in contact with a
foreign intelligence target or inadvertently because the NSA is

200. See, e.g., Anna Aruntunyan & Doug Stanglin, Snowden thanks Russia for
asylum, says 'law is winning,' USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:07 PM),
http://www.usatoday.comlstory/news/nation/2013/08/01/nsa-edward-snowden-russiatemporary-asylum/2607737/; Michael Pearson et al., Snowden's asylum options
dwindle, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/politics/nsa-leak (last updated July 2,
2013).
201. Aruntunyan & Stanglin, supranote 200.
202. Dominic Rush & James Ball, PRISM Scandal: tech giants flatly deny allowing
NSA direct access to servers, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-shock-nsa-data-mining.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text; Ewen MacAskill, NSA paid
millions to cover Prism compliance costs for tech companies, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-compan
ies-paid.
206. MacAskill, supra note 205.
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unable to separate out purely domestic communications."20 7
The Guardian also revealed the existence of a sub-program
called "Boundless Informant,"2 08 which allows the NSA to
quantify the data it collects from U.S. computer systems. 2 09
Boundless Informant appears to focus on transactional data, 2 10
and the ability of the NSA to discern "how much data [is]
gathered from US computers" would seem to contradict some of
its public statements.2 11
Further, The Guardian reported on the government's
interpretation of one of the provisions of the FAA described
above-§ 702, which allowed the FISC to issue broad, yearlong
warrants for the deliberate gathering of communications where
the target of the surveillance is overseas.2 12 According to the
Washington Post, "[t]he law prohibits officials from intentionally
targeting data collection efforts at U.S. citizens or anyone in the
United States" and "[t]he standards for intentional targeting
require that an analyst have a 'reasonable belief,' at least
51 percent confidence, that the target is a foreign national."2 13
Yet much turns on the definition of the term "target," and The
Guardianvalidated the concerns of FAA critics who thought that
incidental collection of American communications would be
acceptable under at least one possible interpretation of the
relevant statutory provision.2 14
According to the new reports, notwithstanding the overseas
targeting requirements, "US communications can still be
207. MacAskill, supra note 205.
208. Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Dan Roberts, White House 'welcomes media interest' in Prism, GUARDIAN
(June 8, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/prismsecurity-media-response?guni=Network%20front:network-front%20full-width- 1%20
bento-box:Bento%20box:Positionl:sublinks.
212. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. § 702(a) (2008),
("[Mlay
at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text
available
authorize .. . for a period of up to 1 year ... the targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States .... ).
213. Robert O'Harrow, Jr. et al., U.S., company officials: Internet surveillance does
not indiscriminately mine data, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2013, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-company-officials-internet-surveillan
ce-does-not-indiscriminately-mine-data/2013/06/08/5b3bb234-dO7d-11e2-9fla- la7cde
e20287_print.html.
214. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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collected, retained and used." 2 15 For example, under guidelines
established at least as early as the summer of 2009, the NSA may
retain data that could include information on Americans for up to
five years, and it could keep and make use of domestic
communications that were gathered inadvertently if they "contain
usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of
harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to
contain any information relevant to cybersecurity. "216
Additionally, the article confirmed that in cases "[w]here
the NSA has no specific information on a person's location,
analysts are free to presume [that person] is overseas." 217 And
although targeted surveillance must stop once it becomes known
that the target is not overseas, NSA analysts can review the
actual content of communications to confirm information
suggesting that a target is within the United States. 218
Variations on this last point began to receive additional coverage
in the following weeks.
In August of 2013, reports surfaced that the NSA has been
searching the contents of "Americans' e-mail and text
communications into and out of the country" in search of people
who discuss foreigners under surveillance. 219 The process for
reviewing such communications involves "temporarily copying
and then sifting through the contents of what is apparently most
e-mails and other text-based communications that cross the
border." 220 According to an anonymous intelligence official, the
process is quick, lasting a few seconds: a computer captures data
as they flow from one location to another, reconstitutes the text
that those data convey, sorts through the text to find the NSA's
chosen terms, and deletes the text that does not contain those
terms while saving text that does contain them for subsequent
human analysis.2 2 1 The official noted that occasionally, the
215. Greenwald & Ball, supra note 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The process for terminating surveillance of targets later discovered to be
within the United States does not exist in cases where the NSA is gathering such
large volumes of data that it is not possible to distinguish between U.S. and non-U.S.
communications. Id.
219. Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Said to Search Content of Messages to and From U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/broader-sifting-ofdata-abroad-is-seen-by-nsa.html?_r=0.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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agency would over-collect data, but that the process was
monitored and violations were reported.2 2 2
Within a week, more NSA documents came to light. An
internal, May 2012 NSA audit revealed nearly 2,800 "incidents,"
ranging back over the preceding year, involving the
"unauthorized collection, storage, access to or distribution of
legally protected communications."2 2 3 Some of these incidents
reflected human error, while others reflected computer error, but
most appear to have been unintentional. 22 4 Nevertheless, the
total tally (2,776) included only violations recorded in the NSA's
Washington, D.C.-area offices.2 25 The incidents vary widely in
type and significance-examples include violation of a court
order, and the improper use of information on 3,000 Americansbut most involve "unauthorized surveillance of Americans or
(It is
foreign intelligence targets in the United States."22 6
impossible to say how many people were affected in total by the
incidents.) 227 Further, the rate of violations actually increased
during the audit period, despite a substantial rise in the number
of personnel dedicated to oversight. 228 Documents also revealed
that audit information the NSA provided to oversight bodies
differed from the information it produced for the internal audit,
with the former omitting some of the incidents included in the
latter under narrow interpretations of what information was
germane to external oversight.229
On August 21, 2013, in response to a Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) lawsuit, intelligence officials declassified an October
2011 FISC opinion in which the court's chief judge castigated the
NSA for misleading the FISC as to the nature and scope of some
of the NSA's domestic surveillance activities. 2 30 According to the
222. Savage, supra note 219.
223. Barton Gellman, NSA broke privacy rules thousands of times per year, audit
finds, WASH. PosT, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/
3310e554-05ca-11e3-aO7f-49ddc7417125 story.html?wpisrc=al comboPN p.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Gellman, supra note 223.
229. Id.
230. Ellen Nakashima, NSA gathered thousands of Americans' e-mails before court
ordered it to revise its tactics, WASH. PoST, Aug. 21, 2013, http://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mailsbefore
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opinion, in May of 2011, the NSA revealed to the court that it had
been collecting full strings of purely domestic communications
that were not from, to, or about a legitimate surveillance
target. 23 1 The NSA had been collecting as many as 56,000 of
these communications annually, and the surveillance practices
that led to this over-collection had been in place for roughly three
years, since the passage of the FAA in 2008.232 The FISC ordered
the NSA to cease such collection, which it deemed
unconstitutional, and subsequently approved a modified
collection technique in November of 2011.233 (The modified
technique screened purely domestic communications to the
FISC's satisfaction, and reduced the retention period for data
from five years to two, though further details remain unclear.) 2 34
The court also criticized the NSA for using improper search terms
in digging through the massive amounts of transactional data it
obtained about Americans' calling records.23 5
Finally, the Wall Street Journal reported on its blog that in
several instances NSA officers used the agency's technical
capacities to spy on their love interests.2 36 The reports did not
identify a precise number of such incidents-collectively referred
to by the term "LOVEINT"-but they all appear to have involved
overseas communications, and most of the incidents were selfreported, resulting in some sort of administrative penalty.2 3 7

Reporting on LOVEINT does not reveal the extent to which these
incidents relied on pieces of the NSA's post-9/11
surveillance program.2 3 8

domestic

While these recent revelations have created pressure to

reform the NSA program, legislative efforts have thus far been
-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90- 11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_sto
ry.html?wpisrc=al comboPN. The Washington Post reported on this issue a week
earlier, before the declassification of the FISC opinion. See Gellman, supra note 223.
231. Nakashima, supra note 230.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Siobhan Gorman, NSA Officers Spy on Love Interests, WASH. WIRE (Aug. 23,
2013, 8:45 PM) [hereinafter Gorman, NSA Love Interests], http://blogs.wsj.
com/washwire/2013/08/23/nsa-officers-sometimes-spy-on-love-interests/.
237. Id.
238. Cf. id. (going on to report Senator Feinstein's claims that "she's seen no
evidence that any of the [LOVEINT] violations involved the use of the NSA's
domestic surveillance structure").
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unsuccessful.

239

The debate continues, and President Obama has
publicly vowed to increase the transparency and oversight of the
program, 24 0 though his proposed changes have yet to have an
effect significant enough to modify the analysis that follows.
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE ICCPR TO THE U.S.
Despite copious reporting on the NSA's activities since 9/11,
the government has consistently sought to keep details about the
program secret, ensuring that even today countless questions
remain unanswered.
Lacking those answers poses obvious
challenges for those seeking to assess the legality of the NSA's
operations.
If whistleblowers like James Binney are to be
believed, the NSA essentially gathers and stores as many
communications
of
Americans-both
domestic
and
international-as it can, focusing its analytical attention on a
small subset of those transactions that it deems fruitful.
Moreover, according to Binney's account, effectively all of this
occurs without any meaningful judicial oversight, or in many
cases, any judicial oversight whatsoever. Edward Snowden's
leaked documents certainly confirm at least a subset of Binney's
allegations. And even operating from facts that have been
confirmed by official government sources, the NSA program is
clearly a massive undertaking that has repeatedly exceeded the
ostensible scope of its domestic legal boundaries, carrying
substantial prima facie potential to violate the human right to
privacy.
As noted above, Article 17 of the ICCPR protects the human
right to privacy.2 4 1 Before examining the terms of that article,
239. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, House Defeats Efforts to Rein In N.S.A. Data
Gathering, N.Y.
TIMES,
July
25,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
07/25/us/politics/house-defeats-effort-to-rein-in-nsa-data-gathering.html?nl=todayshe
adlines&emc=edit th 20130725& r=0 (discussing the perceived ambivalence in
Congress in the wake of unsuccessful reforms but noting a possible shift).
240. Sabrina Siddiqui, Obama Proposes FISA Reforms Amid Growing Concerns
Over NSA Surveillance, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2013, 3:12 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/09/obama-surveillance-reform n_3733090.ht
ml.
241. It is worth noting that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, which has been enforced against the United States by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, also offers some protections for privacy. Specifically,
Article III states that "[e]very person has the right to the protection of the law
against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and family
life." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec.,
art. III, OEA/Ser.L.IV./II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents
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however, it is important to address some preliminary matters to
ensure the terms on which the ICCPR might apply to the United
States. Specifically, this Section will consider the territorial
scope of the treaty, the possibility of blanket exemptions from the
terms of the treaty, and the United States' use of reservations,
understandings, and declarations to modify the applicable terms
of the treaty. With respect to the territorial scope of the ICCPR,
it will become apparent that the United States takes an unusual
and restrictive position. While Section IV will assume that
position for the purposes of analyzing the legality of the NSA
program, it is important to understand the controversial nature
of the United States' view and its implications for the right to
privacy.
A. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE ICCPR
One surprisingly complicated issue concerns the scope of the
ICCPR as it pertains to the United States. The ICCPR defines its
own territorial scope in Article 2(1), which states that "[e]ach
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
2 42
without distinction of any kind.. . ."
There has been some debate about how to interpret "within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." The Human Rights

committee of experts tasked with
of the ICCPR 2 4 3-interprets
the
phrase to mean that "a State party must respect and ensure the
rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or
effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within
the territory of the State Party."24 4 Moreover, the HRC holds the
view that the ICCPR extends to non-citizens-including "all
Committee

(HRC)-the

monitoring implementation

Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc.
6, rev. 1 at 17. The plain text of this article, however, would seem to set a higher bar
than the ICCPR does-prohibiting "abusive attacks" as opposed to "arbitrary or
unlawful interference"-and the American Declaration covers fewer countries than
the ICCPR. Thus, I have elected to focus attention on the ICCPR.
242. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 2(1).
243. For more information on the Committee, see its website. Human Rights

Committee: Monitoring civil and political rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RTS.,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
244. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31, The Nature of the General
10, U.N. Doc.
Legal Obligations on States Parties to the Covenant,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).
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individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as
asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons"who, for whatever reason, find themselves either within the
territory of a state party or within the power or effective control
of that state party outside its own territory.2 4 5 The International
Court of Justice has taken a similar view, as have prominent
commentators like Manfred Nowak.146
The United States, rather notoriously, takes a narrower
view:
The United States in its prior appearances before the
Committee has articulated the position that article 2(1)
would apply only to individuals who were both within the
territory of a State Party and within that State Party's
jurisdiction. The United States is mindful that in General
Comment 31 (2004) the Committee presented [a different
view]. . .. The

United

States

is

also

aware

of

the

jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice ('ICJ'),
which has found the ICPR "applicable in respect of acts done
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own
territory," as well as positions taken by other States
Parties.2 47
Though the United States appears to be the outlier in taking
this interpretation, that fact alone would not necessarily render
its view invalid. If it is fair to say that the United States has
consistently maintained this position on the scope of the ICCPR,
then perhaps as a persistent objector to the more common stance,
the United States' view could be taken as applicable-at least for
its own obligations under the ICCPR, if not for other parties.
Moreover, most of the reporting on the NSA program has focused
on its effects for those who are within the United States, so for
present purposes, it may not matter a great deal which view is
correct.
Nevertheless, the right to privacy (whatever it ultimately
entails) illustrates in some of the starkest terms the

245. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 244.
246. See WALTER KALIN & JORG KUONZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION 129-30 (2010) (describing these views); NOWAK, supra note 21,
at 43-44.
247. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 784
(2013) (emphasis added).
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counterintuitive implications of the United States' position. In its
strongest form, the stance of the United States reduces to the
view that the ICCPR permits states to conduct illegal or arbitrary
surveillance on anyone outside of their own territory or outside of
their jurisdiction. Presumably that is indeed the position of the
United States, which after all originally established the NSA
specifically to conduct foreign surveillance. (Indeed, the agency
has since developed an extremely powerful surveillance
apparatus that continues to collect substantial information
abroad.) But surveillance is particularly troublesome in this
respect because much of it can be done from a distance-via
satellite, for example, or through the interception of
(By
communications that travel through other countries.
contrast, the United States' reading produces much less
counterintuitive results in the case of the right not to be tortured,
which governments might have a much harder time violating

from afar.) 24 8

If one were to generalize the United States' position, then
the ICCPR might secure the privacy of Americans only against
arbitrary and illegal intrusion by the United States, but leave
them vulnerable to intrusion by every other government in the
world.2 49 Similarly, Canadians would be secure as against their
own government, but vulnerable to intrusion by all other
governments. The same would be true again for people within
the territory and jurisdiction of each other state. The right to
privacy under the ICCPR would offer very little protection under
such a view. Further, it is not obvious that the common, broader
reading of the scope of the treaty would be prohibitive for
effective intelligence purposes, barring only illegal and arbitrary
interference with privacy.250
Whatever the geographic scope of the treaty, each state must
do more than simply abstain from intruding on the privacy rights
of those within its territory and jurisdiction. The general rule is
that states must respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of those
who fall within the scope of a binding treaty. 251 But without a
248. Put another way, it is difficult to conceive of a state directly violating many
rights, such as the right not to be tortured, without having some control over the
person whose rights are being violated. Privacy is different in this respect.
249. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17(1).
250. We will consider the meaning of the provisions of Article 17 in more detail
below.
251.

See

What

are

human

rights?,

UNITED

NATIONS

HUMAN

RTS.,
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duty on states not to engage in broad surveillance of those outside
their territory or jurisdiction, the responsibility of each state to
protect its own subjects from the prying of dozens of other states
would be impossible to meet. To the extent that states literally
could not protect their own from violations by other countriesviolations that on the United States' view would not actually
contravene the treaty-the number of privacy intrusions that the
ICCPR would countenance is extraordinary, potentially defeating
the obiect and purpose of the treaty as concerns the right to
privacy.252 If even a subset of the rights guaranteed in the
ICCPR cannot be protected in any meaningful way as a result of a
particular reading of the treaty, then that reading is almost
certainly inadequate.
Nevertheless, if only to yield more
persuasive results, the analysis that follows will stipulate to
interpreting the human rights implications of the NSA program
under the United States' own position on the reach of the ICCPR.
B. BLANKET EXEMPTIONS FROM THE ICCPR

Another preliminary matter to consider is whether there is
reason to think that the ICCPR would be entirely inapplicable to
the NSA program. The answer here appears to be negative. For
one, "[w]ith respect to the application of the Covenant and [IHL],
the United States has not taken the position that the Covenant
does not apply 'in time of war.'"2 53 By foreclosing the possibility
that the ICCPR is simply inapplicable due to wartime
considerations, there is no other obvious reason to think that the
ICCPR would be inapplicable, especially (given the United States'
position on territorial scope) within the United States.25 4
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Feb.
3, 2014); see also Human Rights: The Human Rights-Based Approach, UNITED
(last
NATIONS POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/rights/approaches.htm
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (expressing this commonplace maxim).
252. One possible response might be to note that the United States position is not,
in fact, universal. But the position of the United States is based on a textual reading
of the treaty, suggesting that other states could in principle take the same stance,
thereby opening up that stance to critical assessment for compatibility with the
treaty's object and purpose. Moreover, the U.S. has so much power to conduct
surveillance abroad that even if it alone took this particular reading, the result could
be a substantial number of acts that run contrary to the spirit of the ICCPR. In any
event, as a somewhat separate matter, it is worth noting that states taking a broader
reading of the reach of the ICCPR may need to consider whether their foreign
intelligence surveillance activities align with their treaty obligations not to interfere
arbitrarily or illegally with various protected privacy interests.
253. ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 247, at 784.
254. See supra Section III(A).
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Further, while Article 17 admits of derogation "in time[s] of
public emergency," 5 5 to derogate from any eligible article of the
ICCPR, the United States must "immediately inform other States
Parties [to the ICCPR], through the intermediary of the
Secretary-General ... of the provisions from which it has
derogated and of the reasons by which [the derogation] was
actuated [, as well as, subsequently, send another
communication] on the date on which it terminates such
derogation."156 The United States has not taken any of these
steps, so it cannot have derogated from the requirements of
Article 17.
C. RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND DECLARATIONS

The final preliminary matter is whether the United States
has posited reservations, understandings, or declarations (RUDs)
with respect to the meaning of the terms of Article 17.257 If it
had, those would shape our analysis; however, the United States
did not attach any such modifications when it ratified the ICCPR
in 1992, except to say that Article 17 (among many others) is not
self-executing, thereby keeping it from being judicially
enforceable until and unless the United States passes relevant
domestic legislation. 2 58 That position may have implications for
the practical efficacy of arguments under the ICCPR, especially
as concerns domestic litigation, but it does not affect the
underlying legal analysis involved in making such arguments.
Thus, Article 17 of the ICCPR appears to be in full effect for
purposes of analyzing the implication of the NSA program on the
rights of people within the United States.

255. See ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 4(1)-(2) (offering this quote, and omitting
Article 17 from the list of non-derogable provisions).
256. Id. art. 4(3).
257. For some background on RUDs, see generally Eric Neumayer, Qualified
Ratification: Explaining Reservations to InternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 36 J.
LEGAL STUD. 397 (2007).
258. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&ang-en#EndDec (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (listing the
United States' RUDs on the ICCPR, which includes no references to Article 17
specifically and only contains one relevant declaration to the effect that Article 17 is
not self-executing).
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IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 17 FOR THE NSA
PROGRAM
Recall the text of Article 17: Article 17(1) states that "[n]o
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation,"25 9 while Article 17(2) adds
that "[e]veryone has the right to protection of the law against
such interference or attacks." 260 It may be worthwhile to gain
some perspective on the right to privacy in general before
assessing its more specific terms (barring arbitrary or unlawful
interference) and its precise applications to the NSA program.
A. OVERVIEW
Fernando Volio argues that the right to privacy is one of the
most important rights protected in the ICCPR, especially to the
extent that it protects "individual personality."261 He points out
that the ICCPR uses different constructions to begin its various
articles, such as "all peoples," "everyone," "all citizens," and so on;
however, Article 17 begins with a stronger construction: "No one
shall be deprived. ... "262 According to Volio, the phrase .'[n]o
one' appears whenever the Covenant seeks to underscore a basic
freedom which may not be denied to any person. 2 63 Moreover,
Volio points out that "no limitation provision was added and the
rights are protected without qualification." 264
Manfred Nowak highlights the same textual point: "Art[icle]
17 does not contain a limitation clause allowing for restrictions in
the interest of public order or similar purposes."2 6 5 According to
Nowak, however, the reason for the omission appears to be that
states did not want to have excessive restrictions on their latitude
to determine the limitations on the provisions of Article 17.266 At
the same time, Nowak observes that there was little controversy
259. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17(1).
260. Id. art. 17(2).
261. Fernando Volio, Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
185, 186 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
262. Id. at 190.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 192.
265. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 381.
266. Id. (noting that amendments which would have listed limitations were voted
down in part due to the desire of states to construct their own limitations).
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about adopting a general protection for the right to privacy in the
ICCPR because of the inclusion of a similar right in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).2 67
Nowak also emphasizes that "disregard for personal data
and secret surveillance measures by private security companies [
led during the drafting of Art[icle] 17 to a certain emphasis on the

positive obligation of the States to protect privacy against
interference and attacks from others."2 6 8 While Nowak notes that
several states, including the United States, United Kingdom, and
Australia, took the view during treaty negotiations that the
article only offered protection against interference by the state
(lest states had to make changes to their private law systems), he
also points out that the view of these states did not win out. 2 6 9
The commentary on and jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) may also be helpful in shaping
our interpretation of the ICCPR. Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) 270 strongly
resembles Article 17 of the ICCPR, reading as follows:
8(1): Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
8(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 2 7 1
The European Convention's language is less strict than the
language of the ICCPR, especially insofar as its qualifying
Article, 8(2), explicitly admits of numerous exceptions not listed
267. See NOWAK, supra note 21, at 385 (implying this).
268. Id. at 379 (emphasis in original).
269. Id. at 379-80.
270. For some targeted analysis of how the European Convention on Human
Rights might handle mass surveillance, see Memorandum from Mr. Pieter Omtzigt,
Rapporteur, Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights (Jan. 23, 2014), available at
http://website-pace.net/documents/19838/419003/AS-JUR-2014-02-EN.pdfl2c9ba3c3d456-4471-a39d-087987efl208.
271. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention].
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in the ICCPR's corresponding Article, 17(2). On the other hand,
some commentators have found Article 8(2) to provide better
protection than Article 17 because the former is less vague.2 72
The exclusion of an exhaustive list of limitations on the right to
privacy in the ICCPR followed in part from a concern by states
that such a list would actually make it more difficult for them to
interfere with the right to privacy.2 73 But it is worth noting that
some states objected to a list styled on Article 8(2) of the
European Convention for its implication that the limitations on
interference would apply only to state actors (and not also to
private parties). 274 There is also a question as to the difference
between the European Convention's demand of "respect for" the
interests in Article 8 as against the ICCPR's prohibition of the
"interference with" the interests in Article 17. The ECtHR has
read the "respect for" language as entailing positive (not merely
negative) obligations.27 5 But then again, the widely accepted
"respect, protect, fulfill" framework for the ICCPR would seem to
entail positive obligations for states as well, notwithstanding the
negative language of Article 17.276
Additionally, beyond their syntactical differences, the
terminology in the two articles is somewhat different. The
European Convention protects private life, family life, home, and
correspondence,2 7 7 while the ICCPR protects privacy, family,
home, and correspondence.2 7 8 To the extent that reviewing the
ECtHR approach to the right to privacy is merely instructive and
not decisive, we may infer that the semantic similarities here are
by design, and we may treat each of the four interests in the
ICCPR's Article 17 as analogous to the four interests in the
European Convention's Article 8. (Nowak himself explicitly
indicates that "privacy" in the ICCPR and "private life" in the
European Convention "mean basically the same thing.")279 The
absence of clear, defining boundaries for these four interests in
272. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 381 (noting that some scholars take this view).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See D.J. HARRIS, M. O'BOYLE, & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 321 (1995) (describing these developments).

276. See, e.g., KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 246, at 129 (discussing the duty to
guarantee these rights); see also NOWAK, supra note 21, at 379 (reaffirming positive
obligations under Article 17).
277. See European Convention, supra note 271, art. 8(1).
278. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17(1).
279. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 385.
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the ECtHR system allows for them to overlap, providing the court
with flexible coverage for matters that are difficult to classify

precisely. 280

Note that the ECtHR is more forgiving of government
interference with the right to privacy when the stated purpose for
the interference is the protection of national security (rather
than, say, the pursuit of standard criminal prosecutions). 281 In
the context of wiretapping, the ECtHR largely defers if there
exist "formal legality and procedural guarantees."28 2 Moreover,
"[w]here the authorities have been able to point to a lawful basis
for wire-tapping and procedural protections which satisfy the
[requirement of access to a remedy], the institutions have never
disputed that the interception was 'necessary in a democratic
society.' 283 Yet the ECtHR has also acknowledged the threat
posed by "secret surveillance measures(] 'of undermining or even
destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, [and] affirms
that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle
against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they
deem appropriate.' 28 4 To the extent we wish to draw inferences
from relevant outcomes in the ECtHR, this is surely relevant, so
we will return to it below.
Because Article 17 of the ICCPR does not offer an explicit
exception for national security concerns (or for any other reason),
Volio is skeptical of the possibility of justified interference with
the right to privacy.2 85 Nowak takes a less stringent view, noting
that although Article 17 does not explicitly admit of exceptions,
assessing interference that is both lawful and non-arbitrary
''requires a precise balancing of the circumstances in a given case,
2
paying regard to the principle of proportionality.",
He claims
that to inform our analysis of which purposes might justify
interference with the right to privacy under the ICCPR, we need
to look at limitation clauses from Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, and 22 of
280. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 303.
281. See id. at 346 (elaborating further, specifically by citing cases to this effect).
282. Id. at 354.
283. Id. at 354-55.
284. Protection of Personal Data, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTs. 1 (July 2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FSData_.ENG.pdf (quoting Klass v. Germany,
App. No. 5029/71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 49 (1978)).
285. See Volio, supra note 261, at 192 (claiming the rights in Article 17 "are
protected without qualification").
286. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 383 (emphasis in original).
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the ICCPR-as well as, potentially, the limitations from Article
8(2) of the European Convention. 287 But as a rule of thumb, he
suggests the following:
In evaluating whether interference with privacy by a State
enforcement organ represents a violation of Art[icle] 17, it
must especially be reviewed whether, in addition to
conformity with national law, the specific act of enforcement
had a purpose that seems legitimate on the basis of the
Covenant in its entirety, whether it was predictable in the
sense of rule of law and, in particular, whether it was
reasonable (proportional) in relation to the purpose to be
achieved.288

Nowak's position seems to echo the view of the Human
Rights Committee, which states that "[i]nterference authorized by
States can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must
comply with the provisions, aimsf, and objectives of the
Covenant."2 89 The Committee also observes that "[t]he
introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to
guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in
accordance with the provisions, aims[,] and objectives of the
Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the
particular circumstances."2 9 0
In light of the foregoing, Volio's position appears to be
implausibly strong. Nowak's description of the debate around the
passage of Article 17 suggests that states accepted the existence
of reasons that might justify interfering with the right to privacy,
even if no explicit list of limitations appears in the Article
itself. 29 1 Indeed, Nowak points to several other articles in the
ICCPR to inform our understanding of what sorts of reasons
might justify interference with the right to privacy, and all of
those articles list national security, public safety, or both among
287. NOWAK, supranote 21, at 383.

288. Id.
289. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 16, The Right to Respect of
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and
Reputation (Article 17), T 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 Rev. 6 (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter
General Comment 16], available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain
?docid=453883f922.
290. Id. T 4.
291. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 381 (describing the rejection of amendments that
would have enumerated such justifications due in part to a desire to allow states
some flexibility in defining the appropriate justifications).
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factors that can limit the relevant rights.2 92 Thus, we can
stipulate for the purposes of this Article's analysis that legitimate
concerns about national security (or public safety) would give the
United States a reason to justify its interference with the right to
privacy.
The main question that remains is whether national security
concerns can justify interference with the right to privacy even if
that interference is unlawful or arbitrary. A plain reading of the
text of Article 17 might imply an affirmative answer, for the right
protected there is, specifically, freedom from unlawful and
arbitrary interference with one's privacy, correspondence, and so
on. Thus, an exception to those protections would seem to be an
exception to the prohibition of unlawful and arbitrary
interference-not an exception to the prohibition of interference
per se. Clearly, the most favorable position to the United States
would be that national security justifies unlawful or arbitrary
interference with the right to privacy.
Yet "unlawful" and "arbitrary"-as discussed in more detail
below-are particularly egregious forms of interference, such that
it would seem strange to admit of broad exceptions to their
prohibition. Moreover, even legitimate national security concerns
do not obviously require that a state have the authority to engage
in unlawful or arbitrary interference with any interest, let alone a
privacy
interest (as opposed to lawful, non-arbitrary
interference). 2 93 Both the Human Rights Committee and Nowak
suggest that lawfulness and non-arbitrariness are necessary
conditions for justifiable interference-that is, that a state party
could only justify lawful, non-arbitrary interference-and that
such a state can only interfere with privacy in a manner
proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate aim (perhaps like
national security). 2 94 Additionally, a similar analysis appears to
292. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 381; see also ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 12, 18, 19,
21, 22 (each listing one or both of these reasons for limiting the rights they
respectively protect).
293. In other words, given the power that states have to shape their own domestic
laws, and the questions about the value of pursuing any policy arbitrarily, even
states protecting their own national security do not seem to require the latitude to
violate protected interests either unlawfully or arbitrarily.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 286-290; see also Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
Promotion and Protectionof All Hurman Rights, Civil, Political,Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Human Rights Council,
28, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/23/40, 8 (Apr. 17, 2013) (by Frank La Rue) [hereinafter Special
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prevail in the case of the European Convention, where lawfulness
remains a necessary condition for interference with the right to
privacy (though it may be worth noting that lawfulness is built
into the exceptions clause of Article 8(2) of the European
Convention).295
We will explore the content of the specific prohibitions on
arbitrary and unlawful interference below, once we have reviewed
the relevant protection of the interests enumerated in Article 17.
For now, we may accept that there could be reasons for
interfering with privacy under the ICCPR. We can also conclude
that lawful and non-arbitrary interference is not permitted
simply because it is lawful and non-arbitrary; rather, the state
must avoid unlawful and arbitrary interference generally, and it
can only interfere with the right in a lawful, non-arbitrary
manner if it can justify doing so based on proportional action
designed to advance certain types of state interests, presumably
including national security.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE TERM "PRIVACY"
What interests fall within the right to privacy? Volio argues
that the right "includes much besides the private matters
explicitly listed"-namely, family, home, correspondence, honor,
and reputation."9
He claims that the term "privacy" carries its
own substantial content that extends beyond the itemized list in
Article 17 (pointing to lists of subcomponents of the right to
privacy identified by the 1967 Nordic Conference and Dean
Prosser's list of factors for defining privacy under American tort

law). 297
Nowak claims that privacy, as protected in the ICCPR,
comprises "[t]hat sphere of individual autonomy whose existence

Rapporteur Report], available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
("The framework of
HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf
article 17 of the ICCPR enables necessary, legitimate and proportionate restrictions
to the right to privacy by means of permissible limitations.").
295. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
§ 12.237 (2009) (noting this point).
296. Volio, supra note 261, at 192-93.
297. See id. at 192-95 (undertaking this assessment). Volio also makes some more
He highlights the Human Rights Committee's
specific observations as well.
expression of concern about how states protect individuals from databanks and from
surveillance by state intelligence agencies, and he notes the Committee's suggestion
that individuals might need to be informed when under surveillance. Id. at 196.
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and field of action does not touch upon the sphere of liberty of
others .... "2 98 He notes that "[i]n the 20th century, [protection
for the home, family and correspondence] ... were joined by
secrecy of telecommunications, by the general protection of
personal data and the genetic code of human beings." 299 Like
Volio, Nowak also lists several components of a right to privacy
that reach beyond the enumerated categories in Article 17 but
that are protected under the broader term "privacy."300 He
identifies relevant interests that fall under headings such as
identity, integrity, intimacy, autonomy, communication, and
sexuality. 301
Of particular relevance for present purposes is the category
of intimacy, which Nowak claims includes the "protection of
personal data."30 2
Nowak claims that such protection is
especially important because of "technological developments in
electronic data processing."3 0 3 Under Article 17(2), state parties
must "regulate the recording, processing, use and conveyance of
automated personal data and. . . protect those affected against
misuse by State organs as well as private parties."30 4 Moreover,
"[i]n addition to prohibiting data processing for purposes that are
incompatible with the Covenant, data protection laws must
establish rights to information, correction and, if need be, deletion
of data and to provide effective supervisory measures." 305
Academic commentators are not alone in holding these
views. The Human Rights Committee has also spoken directly
about the collection and storage of personal data:
In order to have the most effective protection of his private
life, every individual should have the right to ascertain in an
intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data is
stored in automatic data files, and for what purposes. Every
individual should also be able to ascertain which public
298. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 378 (emphasis in original).
299. Id.
300. See id. at 385-92 (discussing the coverage provided by the word "privacy.")
301. Id.
302. Id. at 388. While "communication" would seem relevant for us as well, it
turns out to be reasonably uncontroversial that most of the communications that are
subject to interception by the NSA fall into an explicit term in Article 17-namely,
"correspondence." We will revisit this point below.
303. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 388.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may
control their files. If such files contain incorrect personal
data or have been collected or processed contrary to the
provisions of the law, every individual should have the right
to request rectification or elimination. 306
The ECtHR also seems to assume that wiretapping
interferes with the target's private life (independently of whether
it interferes with correspondence).3 0 7 Moreover, once the state
has collected information, for the ECtHR there is a further
question about how it retains or uses that information.3 0 8 Indeed,
"[m]ere storage of information about an individual's private life
amounts to interference within the meaning of Article 8 [of the
European Convention]." 309 And as concerns covert government
surveillance, while such activity can be justified under certain
conditions in the ECtHR system, the court requires adequate
safeguards.3 10
306. General Comment 16, supra note 289, 10.
307. See HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 309 (defending this
view). For more on the ECtHR stance toward wiretapping see Protectionof Personal
Data,supra note 284, at 3 (summarizing relevant precedents, which include several
findings of article 8 violations grounded in wiretapping).
308. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 310-11; see also Protection
of Personal Data, supra note 284, at 5-7 (summarizing relevant precedents on the
collection and use of personal data).
309. Protection of PersonalData,supra note 284, at 1.
310. Id. The court has not been particularly specific about what safeguards might
be adequate. For example, in Klass v. Germany, it articulated a fluid standard for
adequacy of privacy protections for covert government surveillance. "The Court must
be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there exist adequate
and effective guarantees against abuse. This assessment has only a relative
character: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope
and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering such
measures, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such
measures, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law." Klass v. Germany,
App. No. 5029/71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 50 (1978), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57510#.
In Rotaru v.
Romania, the court observed that Article 8 of the Convention requires
safeguards established by law which apply to the supervision of the relevant
services' activities. Supervision procedures must follow the values of a
democratic society as faithfully as possible, in particular the rule of law, which is
expressly referred to in the Preamble to the Convention. The rule of law
implies, inter alia, that interference by the executive authorities with an
individual's rights should be subject to effective supervision, which should
normally be carried out by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, since judicial
control affords the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper
procedure.
Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 449
59, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58586#{"itemid":["001-58
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Moreover, the ECtHR would seem to concur with the Human
Rights Committee and with Nowak on the problems with
collecting vast amounts of transactional data.
Under the
approach of the ECtHR, respect for one's "private life" appears
implicated by the nonconsensual collection of personal
information by state officials."' This includes such information
as is gathered by a census and as one might surrender in being
fingerprinted and photographed by the police.3 12 It can also
include information "relating to [a person] through [his or] her
use of the telephone, e-mail and [I]nternet."3 13 If we can infer
anything from the conclusions of the ECtHR, surely a detailed
history of one's financial transactions, the recipients of one's
correspondence, and the subjects of one's emails would be
problematic as well.314
Additionally, for the ECtHR, the mere possibility that a state
might use a criminal statute to prosecute an individual for
private behavior (for instance, intimate same-sex relations) could
be sufficient to violate the right to privacy of a person who forms
such relations-even if the state never ultimately charges the
person in question. 315 The psychological effect of the uncertainty
in those circumstances is sufficient to interfere with the freedom
to engage in private behavior.3 16 Indeed, that principle has a
586"]}. Even more recently, in Association "21 December 1989" and Others v.
Romania, the court found a violation of Article 8 when secret services undertook
surveillance of an applicant and the relevant "domestic law did not indicate with
reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion
conferred on the public authorities." Press Release, European Court of Human
Rights, Crackdown on Romanian Demonstrations in 1989: Lack of Effective
Investigation and Use of Secret Surveillance 5 (May 24, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3549731-40 11007#
{"itemid":["003-3549731-4011007"]}.
311. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 309.
312. Id.
313. See Protection of PersonalData,supra note 284, at 8 (attributing the court's
finding of an Article 8 violation in Copland v. United Kingdom to the "collection and
storage" of that same information about the applicant).
314. The last of these might simply fall into the category of correspondence, as
discussed below.
315. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 336. More specifically, in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, the court held that the mere possibility of prosecution
under a law criminalizing homosexual relations "continuously and directly affects
[the petitioner's] private life." Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 41 (1981), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57473#.
316. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. J1 40-41 (accepting the applicant's claims to
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broader application: a recurring theme in ECtHR jurisprudence
on privacy is that states violate the European Convention when
undertaking various surveillance activities without first
establishing "sufficient clarity" as to the permissible "scope and
manner" of those activities.3 1 7
Applicants are thus well
positioned if they can show why they might be the target of
surveillance, even if they in fact turn out not to have been, for
"'[in the mere existence of the legislation itself there is involved,
for all those to31whom
the legislation could be applied, a menace of
8
surveillance."'

C. THE SCOPE OF THE TERM "CORRESPONDENCE"
Traditional definitions of the term "correspondence" refer
specifically to letters, 319 but that definition does not stand for
legal purposes under the ICCPR. Nowak notes that the term
"correspondence" "primarily means written letters, [but] today
covers all forms of communications over distance, i.e., by
telephone, telegram, telex, telefax, e-mail and other mechanical
or electronic means of communication." 32 0 Similarly, Volio writes
that
"[c]orrespondence
clearly
includes
written
communication ... [as well as] direct oral communication, and
today must include communication by any mechanical or
electronic means."32 1 Both the Human Rights Committee322 and
the ECtHR have also classified phone calls as falling within the
category of correspondence. 323
In Nowak's view, under Article 17(2), state parties have a
"comprehensive obligation . . . to ensure that letters, telegrams,
suffering "fear and distress," and going on to find the existence of the law causing
those feelings as constituting an interference with the right to privacy).
317. See Protection of Personal Data, supra note 284, at 2, 4 (noting Wisse v.
France, Kruslin v. France, and Vetter v. France as examples of cases where states
were found to be in violation of Article 8 because their domestic laws do not indicate
"with sufficient clarity . . . the scope or manner" of permissible activity).
318. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 337 (internal citation
omitted).
319. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 327 (2d college ed. 1982)

(defining "correspondence" as "[clommunication by the exchange of letters").
320. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 401.

321. Volio, supra note 261, at 197.
322. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Third PeriodicReport (Bulgaria),1 22, U.N.
Doc. CCPRIC/BGRICO/3 (Aug. 19, 2011).
323. HARRIS, O'BoYLE, &WARBRICK, supra note 275 at 303 n.7, 320.
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emails, etc. are actually delivered to the desired recipient and are
not inspected by third parties." 3 24 For Nowak, this means that
"[e]very withholding, censorship, inspection of (or listening to) or
publication of private correspondence represents interference
within the meaning of Art[icle] 17."325 Again, Volio has a similar
take: the nature of the protections for correspondence includes
protection "primarily against divulgence to anyone other than the
intended recipient," but also protection "against interruption or
other interference" such as would delay or prevent its delivery. 32 6
Nowak makes some more specific claims that are relevant as
well, pointing out that state surveillance for counterterrorism or
criminal prosecution amounts to the most common type of
He emphasizes that,
interference with correspondence.32 7
"[s]imilar to house searches, such interference is permissible only
on the basis of a specific decision by a State authority expressly
empowered by law to do so (usually a court) for the purpose of
securing evidence or preventing crime and must respect the
principle of proportionality." 328 Here again the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR is instructive. In Campbell v. UK, the ECtHR found
that a prison regime that permits the officials to open and read
letters sent by inmates supplied one such inmate with a colorable
claim to a violation of his Article 8 right to privacy, even if he
could not show that his own letters had, in fact, been
compromised.329

In sum, the collection and review of verbal communications,
whether oral or written, would seem to amount to interference
with correspondence under Article 17. Inferring from the ECtHR
system, even the mere threat that such correspondence could be
reviewed may be sufficient to ground a complaint of interference
with correspondence.33 0
324. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 401. Note that this does not mean there is a right
to a perfectly functioning postal service. Id.
325. Id. (emphasis in original).
326. Volio, supra note 261, at 197.
327. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 402.
328. Id.

329. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 335. This approach quite
plainly diverges for the recent Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty
International, USA, which we will discuss briefly below. For more on how the
ECtHR has interpreted the application of Article 8 to the correspondence of persons
detained by the state see Protection of PersonalData,supranote 284, at 2.
330. See Protection of Personal Data, supra note 284, at 1 ("Mere storage of
information about an individual's private life amounts to interference within the
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D. TAKING STOCK
The preceding analysis of the right to privacy under Article
17 of the ICCPR is not exhaustive. It has discussed neither
protection of the family, nor protection of the home-let alone
honor, reputation, or other areas of coverage arguably falling
within the ambit of the broader term "privacy." 331 The areas
covered, however, are those most relevant to analysis of the
implications of the NSA surveillance program. Reports on the
NSA program have thus far revealed three major ways in which
the United States government is potentially infringing the right
to privacy under the ICCPR: 332 first, through the collection or
inspection of emails; second, through the recording or analysis of
phone calls; and third, by storing or reviewing transactional data.
The first two of these fall within the scope of protections for
correspondence, while the third falls (by and large) under the
protection for privacy more generally.
Actual review of any of these forms of information
unequivocally constitutes interference,
and states have a
positive obligation to prevent the review of private information
(like the content of communications) by third parties 33 4 -an
obligation undermined by the collection and retention of that
information. Moreover, if ECtHR jurisprudence is instructive
here, both the simple collection of these forms of information 33 5
and the fact that the government can review them may be
sufficient to produce an intrusion. 336 Thus, all three of these
forms of data-gathering or review appear to constitute
"interference" under Article 17(1).
Focusing on these three areas, even if limited to those
individuals who are within the territory and subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, the NSA program carries the
potential for a large number of violations of the right to privacy

meaning of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) of the European Convention on
Human Rights.").
331. See supra Section IV(B).
332. Of course, it is possible that the NSA is gathering yet further information in
other ways that would introduce new categories into our analysis were we to learn of
it.
333. See supra text accompanying note 325.
334. See supra text accompanying note 324.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 309-11.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 307-318, 329.
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under Article 17 of the ICCPR. The question remains whether
such collection can be justified under the terms of the ICCPRwhether it is lawful, non-arbitrary, and proportionate.
Before proceeding to unpack the ways in which the ICCPR
could apply to the NSA program, it is helpful to consider certain
peculiarities about the right to privacy as discerned by the
preceding analysis. As indicated above, the Human Rights
Committee, various commentators, and the ECtHR all suggest
that even the improper interception of correspondence or data,
without review, can be enough to violate the right to privacy. Yet
the harm caused by the wrongful collection of data or
correspondence seems to differ from the harm caused by the
wrongful review of data or correspondence. To the extent that
much of the public reporting about the NSA program contains
about the broad collection of
allegations specifically
information,3 3 7 a substantial proportion of the concern about the
program (though certainly not all of it) tracks the former more
than the latter. Those who dispute the concerns about mere
collection of information may find that share of worry about the
program overblown. 338
The fact that the government has certain information on
hand-even if analysts never review it-leaves the subjects of
that information vulnerable and uncertain. This is especially the
case where it remains unclear what information is available to
the government, as well as if and when the information will be
accessed. The theoretical possibility of improper access to stored
information (against whatever safeguards the state imposes) can
be enough to trigger genuine worries even where there is
supposed to be less uncertainty. That is essentially the harm
that the ECtHR has identified in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 339
337. See, e.g., Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79; Greenwald, NSA
collectingphone records, supra note 2.
338. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST,
Dec.
21,
2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
12/20/AR2005122001053.html (arguing that while "collection ... of personal data is
said to invade privacy[, . . .] machine collection and processing of data cannot, as
such, invade privacy"); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the NSA, DEFINING IDEAS
(June 18, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/149766
(asserting that there is a "line between collection and use [of information collected by
the NSA]").
339. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
1 40-41 (1981) (noting the "fear and distress ... suffered in consequence of the
existence of the laws . . .").

2013] NSA Surveillance and the Human Right to Privacy 919
and it is difficult to dispute.
Perhaps some will find it worse for the government to review
private information or correspondence, as those acts would
clearly amount to violations of privacy in fact, whereas simple
collection of information might seem like a precursor or threat to
the violation of privacy. Alternatively, one might see the mere
possession of private information by an unauthorized party to be
a direct affront to privacy.340 However one cognizes the relevant
harms, the link between the two is clear enough, as are the
interpretations of the ICCPR and European Convention.3 4 1 Both
fall, defensibly, within the bounds of the human right to privacy.
A further complication that arises with respect to the
collection of emails (and perhaps certain information available
online) is that companies providing email services often have
privacy policies that explicitly allow them to collect certain
information.342 Google's privacy policy, for example, lists several
sorts of information that it gathers in connection with the use of
its services, including Internet search histories and, in some
cases, GPS tracking information.3 4 3 There is no doubt that using
email providers like Google involves granting a third party access
to a substantial amount of personal information, raising the
following question: to what extent does consenting to such
collection undermine the ability of individuals to claim that the
government is violating their privacy rights by gathering much of
the same information? 3 4 4
Whatever the ultimate answer to that question, there are
plainly significant differences between consensual data collection
by private companies in exchange for the use of their services and
nonconsensual, 34 5 wholesale collection of data by a government
340. For much more nuanced discussions of the different harms posed by collection
and review of private information, see generally Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. R. 1934 (2013) and Daniel J. Solove, 'I've Got Nothing to
Hide'and Other Misunderstandingsof Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. R. 745 (2007).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 333-336 (noting the interpretations of the
ICCPR and European Convention that would condemn mere collection of
information).
342. See,
e.g.,
Policies
&
Principles: Privacy
Policy, GOOGLE,
(last modified Dec. 20, 2013)
http://www.google.comlintl/en/policies/privacy/
(outlining the information Google gathers from users of its services).
343. Id.
344. I am grateful to Faiza Patel for raising this question.
345. For example, Google's stated policy is not to turn over any information to the
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that has coercive power over the subjects of those data.
Moreover, given the necessity of conducting certain business
online, people are often effectively forced into using technology
that makes it easier for the private companies to gather
information of the sort Google describes in its policy. Employees
are often required to use company email to perform their duties,
and students at colleges and universities (not to mention some
secondary schools) literally must use their email to some extent to
remain apprised of academic developments. If it turns out that
email providers have truly deficient privacy policies under
conditions where individuals have effectively no choice but to
consent, it is not so clear that the policies are valid. Perhaps
these agreements are more like contracts of adhesion.
Finally, consenting to the terms of use for an email account
is certainly not the same thing as consenting to the active
harvesting of one's email communications-outside the terms of
the account provider's privacy policy-by the government. To the
extent that the government picks up emails via splitter cabinets,
or copies and searches the text before deleting the emails, this is
very much an applicable consideration in the context of the NSA
program.846
government unless compelled by law. Policies & Principles: Privacy Policy, supra
note 342. Additionally, it can be difficult or impossible even for experts, let alone
laypeople, to figure out when their information will be at risk of submission to the
government under valid legal requests.
346. This summary is necessarily cursory, simply laying out a few reasons why we
may continue with our analysis.
For more detailed discussions and diverse
perspectives, see generally Jonathan Bick, Internet Communications Privacy Rights:
Existing Statutes and Case Law Reduce ConstitutionalProtections, 195 N.J. L. J. 793
at
http://www.bicklaw.comlinternetcommunicationprivacy
(2009),
available
rights.htm (summarizing some domestic legal standards for expectations of privacy);
Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503
(2007) (canvassing four models of protection for privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, and advocating the use of all of them depending on which is most
appropriate in a given context); Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of
Privacy (U. Chicago Public Law Working Paper No. 79 Dec. 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=629283
(arguing that courts
should use objective metrics such as the likelihood that certain information will
become known to the public, rather than subjective expectations of privacy, in
deciding which information about a person is legally protected); Joshua Foust, Nine
Dashed-Off Points on the NSA "Scandal,"JOSHUA FOUST: RECOVERING JOURNALIST
(June 5, 2013), http://joshuafoust.com/nine-dashed-off-points-on-the-nsa-scandall
(arguing that people will not be moved enough by recent revelations about NSA
surveillance to stop voluntarily turning over their information to service providers
like Verizon, and as a result that people do not care a great deal about privacy);
Eyder Peralta, In Discussion About Internet Privacy, It Comes Down To Expectation

2013] NSA Surveillance and the Human Right to Privacy 921
There is one further point to address here. Earlier I
suggested the possibility that the United States, in essence, has
violated the human right to privacy countless times. The
analysis below will explore in more detail whether that might be
true. But the mere claim that trillions of violations may have
occurred 347 already raises a question as to how we understand the
notion of a discrete violation of the right to privacy. While this is
not the place to elaborate on a philosophical account of the right
to privacy, it may be worth addressing how the numbers climb so
rapidly, for not all rights conduce to violation in such large
batches.34 8
In advancing the possibility of a large number of violations, I
consider any single act that could be deemed a violation of Article
17 to be a candidate for the purposes of tallying a hypothetical
count. Suppose one sends an email from within the United States
to a friend who also happens to be in the United States. Assume
that the NSA improperly intercepts the message, saving it in
some database. That act could involve at least two violations of
the right to privacy: one violation against the sender and one
against the recipient. If, as a result of having saved the email
without proper authorization, six different analysts read the
email, then there might be twelve more violations of the right to
privacy: six additional violations against the sender and six more
against the recipient.3 4 9 Imagine next that the NSA recognizes
that it ought not (legally speaking) to have this email in its
database. Perhaps at that point, based on the comments of the
Human Rights Committee, failure to delete it generates another
pair of violations of the right to privacy (once again, one against
the sender and one against the recipient).3 5 0
Versus Reality, NPR (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2013/02/25/172909918/in-discussion-about-internet-privacy-it-comes-down-toexpectation-versus-reality (describing a dissonance between people's expectations of
privacy regarding online activity and communications on one hand and the
applicable legal standards on the other).
347. See supra text accompanying note 18.
348. Again, I thank Faiza Patel for noting the significance of this issue.
349. Matters might get complicated if the same analyst repeatedly accesses the
email, or simply maintains constant access to it over some extended period. Perhaps
we would call each access a violation, while extended review of the email would
involve only a single, particularly egregious violation. I modestly favor the latter
position, but there is no need to settle these penumbral issues here.
350. The next natural question would be whether indefinite retention of the email
would in itself generate further violations of the right to privacy, or would instead
count toward the seriousness of the initial violations. As before, I incline toward
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As this example illustrates, a striking feature of the
structure of the right to privacy is that a single piece of
information or correspondence, if handled improperly, can
generate a large number of rights violations. That seems entirely
appropriate because if a piece of information is protected as
private against many different people, each of those people could
engage in discrete violations of the right to privacy by accessing
that information improperly. Each piece of protected information
constitutes a node that may, in theory, serve as the basis for a
substantial number of violations of the right to privacysometimes for more than one person at a time, as in the case of
protected communications. Given how many pieces of potentially
protected information exist about each individual, we might
visualize the right to privacy as extending to a substantial web of
data points around each person, protecting each point in the web
from certain forms of interference or inspection. Indeed, the
metaphysical feature of the right that generates this result is not
unique to privacy. For example, one person's ownership of a plot
of land can ground a large number of discrete trespasses if many
different people walk across it (even as a group) without requisite
cause or permission.35 1 Each plot of land constitutes a node in
the web of the owner's property interests, all of which can ground
trespasses against the owner. Moreover, in both the privacy case
and the trespass case, the discrete trespasses can vary in the
extent to which they harm the owner, but that alone does not
change the way one counts up the illegal acts.
Violations of other rights manifest differently. Rights not to
be tortured3 52 or not to be detained arbitrarily 35 3 attach directly to
each protected person and are only violated when a protected
person is mistreated. There is only one locus for violations of the
right: the person himself. Even in a state that widely tortures or
detains people arbitrarily, the number of violations of the rights
to be free from such treatment will simply never threaten to
approach the number of potential privacy violations that could
occur in a state that widely conducts illegal surveillance of its
people. That is just a feature of what the right protects against,
and thus, the ways in which it can be violated.
taking the latter view, but I do not have a definitive intuition on the question.
351. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (offering a definition of
trespass compatible with this example, focusing on the actions of each individual).
352. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7.
353. Id. art. 9(1).
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The number of violations and the seriousness of each
violation are largely independent, but privacy introduces an
interesting wrinkle here. If the NSA improperly collects enough
data points about a person, the seriousness of the total harm to
that person could transcend the seriousness of the harm caused
by the collection of each individual piece of information. That is,
the whole harm could be greater than the sum of its parts. A
distinct fact in isolation may not reveal a great deal that is
private about a person, but a collection of information detailed
enough to expose further information by implication or by the
interaction of its individual data points could reveal exponentially
more.
In cases where many violations result from the improper
storage and review of a single email, perhaps the large total
number of violations appears misleading to the extent that one is
naturally primed to infer greater harm from it. But in cases
where the large number of violations involves the assembly and
deployment of a wide array of data to create detailed pictures of
people's activities and preferences, the large number of violations
may actually understate the harm. Some of these features of the
right to privacy may be helpful in considering the ways in which
portions of the NSA program are potentially in conflict with the
ICCPR.

V. THE LEGALITY OF THE NSA PROGRAM UNDER
ARTICLE 17

A. APPLYING "UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE

354

First, Article 17's prohibition on "unlawful interference" is
typically taken to mean that justifiable interference must
generally comply with the state's legal system (including "laws,
ordinances[,] and judicial directives"). 3 5 5 At the very least, if the
state is interfering with the right to privacy in contravention of
its own domestic law, then it is presumptively violating Article
17.356
As indicated above, one important function of the

354. Though the term "arbitrary" precedes the term "unlawful" in Article 17(1),
making it more natural in one sense to analyze arbitrariness first, the fact (as
documented above) that the term "arbitrary" reaches further than the term
"unlawful" makes it analytically simpler to begin with the latter.
355. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 382.
356. A similar result would likely obtain in the ECtHR. See HARRIS, O'BOYLE, &
WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 343-44 (discussing the ECtHR position on policies that

924

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 59

lawfulness requirement is to make sure that interference is
"predictable in the sense of the rule of law."35 7 Additionally, the
Human Rights Committee observes that "[t]he term 'unlawful'
means that no interference can take place except in cases actually
envisaged by the law. And interference authorized by States can
only take place on the basis of law that itself must comply with
the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant."
Second, a state cannot "avoid its obligation[s] under Art[icle]
17 simply by failing to enact the relevant prohibitive norms or by
providing its organs with unreasonably broad discretion for
interfering with privacy, since it would thus violate its positive
duty of protection set forth in Art[icle] 17(2)."359
Although the precise language differs, consider again the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as Article 8(2) of the European
Convention includes the requirement that any interference with
the rights laid out in 8(1) be "in accordance with the law
and ... necessary in a democratic society [for the protection of a
serious societal interest enumerated in the European
Convention]."3 60 For the ECtHR, there must be an operative
domestic statute governing the surveillance in question; failure of
a state to enact a statute governing its surveillance activities can
yield the result that those activities are "not in accordance with
the law."36 1
Third, Nowak also claims "unlawful" might "cover violations

appear to violate the domestic law of the defendant state).
357. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 383.
358. General Comment 16, supra note 289, 1 3.
359. Id. In some ways, this suggestion is difficult to comprehend fully, for it
implies that the term "lawful" contains at least two elements: first, interference
should be sanctioned officially by law, but second, even if it is, the law must meet
some independent standard. The first of these elements uses "lawful" in a purely
formal sense, while the second uses it in a substantive, normative sense.
360. European Convention, supra note 271, art. 8(2).
361. See Protectionof Personal Data, supra note 284, at 8 (discussing Copland v.
United Kingdom) ('The Court considered that the collection and storage of personal
information relating to Ms Copland through her use of the telephone, e-mail and
Internet had interfered with her right to respect for her private life and
correspondence, and that that interference was not 'in accordance with the law,'
there having been no domestic law at the relevant time to regulate monitoring."); see
also id. at 5 (discussing Taylor-Sabori u. United Kingdom) ("Violation of Article 8:
there had been no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages
transmitted via a private telecommunication system.").
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of international law binding on the State party concerned."36 2
Where there is a statute in place that guides the state in
interfering with the right to privacy, that statute can only be
valid if it provides "'the minimum degree of protection to which
citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic
society.' 3 63 Luxembourg defeated a challenge to a wiretapping
law by stipulating that the European Convention applied to its
domestic law, suggesting that the law would have to conform to
the Convention even in domestic adjudication; thus, even though
potential targets of surveillance were not notified before their
phones were tapped, the law required people to have access to
general information about when phones might be tapped.3 6 4
In a case called "Malone,"3 65 the ECtHR came down against
the United Kingdom's use of broad administrative authority to
design secret surveillance protocols.3 6 6 The court disapproved of
the government's ability to change the parameters of its
surveillance activities at any time it saw fit. 36 7 The United
Kingdom satisfied the European Commission of Human Rights by
adopting a law that provided a statutory basis for its surveillance,
even though the corresponding grievance mechanism that it
established carved out no role for the courts and made it difficult
for complainants to meet the requisite burden of proof. 368
The NSA program has had a long, complicated relationship
with domestic law in the United States, and indeed, the scholarly
literature on the program almost exclusively concerns the
relationship of the program, in whole or in part, to various pieces
of domestic law. 369 Evolving domestic law, incomplete public
362. Protectionof PersonalData,supra note 284, at 8.
363. See HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 340 (internal citations
omitted) (reading this as a concern in part about arbitrary use of the power).
364. Id. at 340; Mersch v. Luxembourg, App. No. 10439/83, 43 DR 34 (1985).
365. Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1984),
available at http://www.worldlii.org/eulcases/ECHR/1984/10.html.
366. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 338-39.
367. Id.

368. Id. at 339.
369. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 60 (arguing that the NSA program is one of
several policies enacted by the Bush Administration pursuant to a troublingly broad
reading of the United States Constitution); SCHOENFELD, supra note 32 (arguing
that leaks of national security information are becoming increasingly dangerous and
ought to be prosecuted under applicable domestic statutes); Patricia L. Bellia, The
"Lone Wolf" Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50
VILL. L. REV. 425 (2005) (discussing the political and constitutional implications of
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disclosures, and changes to the program itself all complicate
efforts to conduct a clean analysis of the legality of the NSA's
efforts under federal statutes. For the present purpose of making
an initial foray into underappreciated territory, this Subsection
will highlight several major reasons for thinking that the NSA
program might have failed (and potentially continues to fail) to
changes to the FISA framework making it easier to conduct surveillance on 'lone
wolf" terror suspects); David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Security
Agency's Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355 (2006)
(arguing that if federal law is inadequate for the purpose of authorizing the requisite
surveillance, the President ought to change the law rather than secretly violating it);
Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog, 34
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 249 (2002) (arguing that the judiciary has imposed
insufficient constraints on surveillance by the U.S. government); Matthew Robinson,
Freedom in an Era of Terror: A CriticalAnalysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, 4 JUST.
POL'Y J., Spring 2007, available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/
freedomin.pdf (assessing the USA Patriot Act and the implications of the public
response for future legislation); Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National
Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811 (2007) (recommending adjustments to
the domestic legal framework for the use of secrecy in national security
investigations); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287 (2008) (arguing that changes are needed in regulating
telecommunications surveillance to balance civil liberties and security concerns
better); Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists:
Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449
(2007) (arguing that under certain conditions the President has constitutional
authority to conduct surveillance of the sort done by the NSA, even if doing so
violates a duly enacted statute); Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, The NSA
Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional Oversight during an
Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149 (2006) (assessing congressional
oversight over the NSA program and finding it generally to be lacking); Bennie J.
Thompson, The National CounterterrorismCenter: Foreign and Domestic Intelligence
Infusion and the Potential Threat to Privacy, 6 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 6 (2006)
(arguing for stronger safeguards on the National Counterterrorism Center); Nathan
C. Henderson, Note, The PatriotAct's Impact on the Governments'Ability to Conduct
Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179
(2002) (arguing that the changes made to the domestic legal framework by the USA
PATRIOT Act collectively pose a threat to privacy); Jeremy Neff, Note, Does (FISA +
NSA) * AUMF - HAMDI = Illegal Domestic Spying?, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006)
(assessing the argument advanced by the Bush Administration that the NSA
program is authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force in
Afghanistan); Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of
the Warrantless Surveillance Program (Mar. 11, 2009) (unpublished), available at
http://works.bepress.com/kathleenclark/2 (arguing that most of the accountability
mechanisms capable of checking the executive branch when it violates the law in fact
failed in the case of the NSA program); David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign
Intelligence
Surveillance
Act,
Brookings
Institution,
available
at
http://www.brookings.edul-/media/research/files/papers/2007/11/15%20nationalsecur
ity%20kris/1115nationalsecurity-kris
(exploring the
relationship
between
modifications to the FISA framework, such as the PAA and the FAA, and technical
aspects of various communications).
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meet the lawfulness requirement of Article 17. This Article will
cover six areas: collection of data beyond the scope intended by
the United States government; the extra-legal origins of the NSA
program, which bypassed the governing domestic statute (FISA);
the numerous doubts as to the legality of the program among
government officials; the provision of immunity to complicit
private parties; the sheer size and scope of the program; and the
outsourcing of surveillance about Americans to friendly foreign
governments.
1. ACCIDENTAL OVER-COLLECTION OF DATA

As summarized earlier, there have been a number of
instances in which the government has admitted to overcollecting data for the NSA program in violation of the law. Key
government admissions of this nature occurred in: late 2005 (just
days after the first New York Times report on the program), when
the government acknowledged having picked up purely domestic
phone calls because of a technical glitch and thus without a
warrant; 3 7 0 April of 2009, when the government acknowledged
(perhaps accidentally) stepping outside of the operative legal
framework in the collection of Americans' emails; 37 1 June of 2009,
when the New York Times reported that the government
overstepped its FISC authorization in eight to ten cases (yielding
improper collection of potentially millions of communications); 37 2
August of 2013, when a declassified FISC opinion revealed that
the NSA had been using an unconstitutional collection procedure
for approximately three years following the passage of the
FAA;3 7 3 August of 2013, when the Washington Post reported on
the May 2012 internal NSA audit revealing nearly 2,800
improper collection or access incidents over the course of the
37 4
previous twelve months in NSA offices near Washington D.C.;
and potentially August of 2013, when the Wall Street Journal
reported that NSA officers have periodically and improperly used
the NSA's capacities to spy on their love interests (depending on
whether the officials behind those incidents relied on the post-

370. Risen & Lichtblau, Spying Program,supra note 109.
371. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 157.
372. Risen & Lichtblau, E-Mail Surveillance,supra note 162.
373. Nakashima, supra note 230.
374. Gellman, supra note 223 (reporting the number, and noting that most were
unintended).
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9/11 program's technical machinery)."'
These instances appear problematic for the United States'
obligations under the ICCPR. Even if these violations of domestic
law occurred by accident-and according to news reports, only
some of them did-they nevertheless occurred in contravention of
the operative legal framework and potentially to the detriment of
millions of Americans. Moreover, the fact that the NSA violated
domestic law so many times suggests a systemic problem,
perhaps a lax approach by the agency toward its international
human rights obligations as an arm of the United States
government. 376
Indeed, as noted previously, the rate of
inadvertent over-collection incidents appears to have increased
over the period of the internal May 2012 audit.
Additionally, the Human Rights Committee clearly states
what should happen when the government accidentally collects
information on individuals improperly: "If [one's personal data,
stored in automatic data] files contain incorrect personal data or
have been collected or processed contrary to the provisions of the
law, every individual should have the right to request
rectification or elimination."" Suffice it to say that the United
States has never offered publicly to disclose such information to
those wronged by over-collection, nor made clear that it will
adjust its databases accordingly by deleting the information that
was gathered improperly.378 Indeed, in the wake of the Supreme
Court decision in Clapper, Americans have no legal recourse to
challenge domestic surveillance under the now-operative FAA if
they cannot prove that they were harmed; thus, even justified
suspicion that one has had his communications or information
improperly collected is insufficient to provide standing to bring a

375. Gorman, NSA Love Interests, supra note 236. Note that Sen. Feinstein
claimed to have seen no evidence suggesting that LOVEINT "involved the use of
NSA's domestic surveillance infrastructure." Id.
376. Recall that lawfulness under domestic law is a requisite for interference with
privacy under the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17.
377. General Comment 16, supra note 289, 1 10 (emphasis added); see also U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
22, U.N. Doc.
Article 40 of the Covenant, Fourth Periodic Report (France),
CCPR/CIFRA/CO/4(July 31, 2008) (reiterating the same point).
378. It is worth noting, however, that there is at least one reported instance of the
NSA "purging" improperly collected information, which took place in April of 2012, a
few months after the agency had satisfied the FISC that it had replaced its
unconstitutional search provision. Nakashima, supra note 230.
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legal claim.37 9
2.

EXTRA-LEGAL INITIATION OF THE PROGRAM

A second way in which the NSA program may run afoul of
the lawfulness requirement is through the fact that the initial
implementation of the program in 2001 completely bypassed the
widely recognized legal framework for conducting domestic
surveillance-that is, it was conducted outside of FISA (even as
modified by the USA PATRIOT Act), with the government leaving
the FISC out of the loop. Americans who communicated with
parties abroad were subject to warrantless surveillance,
notwithstanding FISA's prohibition of such conduct and the
attendant clause that identified FISA as the sole means by which
domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes may be
The government has maintained that it
conducted.3 8 0
nevertheless has the authority to initiate the program, under
broad theories of executive power and, indirectly, under the
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by
Congress in 2001 to permit the government to use force against
those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.3 8 1
Whether or not the executive branch possesses such power
has been a matter of substantial debate,38 2 and it is not easy to
379. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
380. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2008).
381. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 38 (arguing that a broad reading of
presidential power underlies the NSA program, among other policies established by
the Bush Administration); see Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 111, at 157 (citing
congressional testimony by former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez as evidence
that the Bush Administration claimed power to undertake the NSA program through
the AUMF).
382. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 36-37 (arguing that the statutory
language clearly and conclusively bars some of the activities of the NSA during the
early era of the program); Seamon, supra note 369, at 504 (arguing that under
certain conditions the President has constitutional authority to conduct surveillance
of the sort done by the NSA, even if doing so violates a duly enacted statute);
Sugiyama & Perry, supra note 111, at 157 (noting the congressional testimony of
former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez to the effect that authority for the NSA
program derives from the AUMF); Jay Bybee, Memorandum to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (The "Torture Memo") § 5, at 31-38, available at
http://www.tomjoad.orglbybeememo.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (arguing, among
other things, that parts of the United States Code that appear to restrict the
authority of the government to engage in aggressive interrogation of enemy
combatants may constitute an unconstitutional infringement on the president's
powers as commander-in-chief.). For background on the question of the president's
constitutional authority, see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand
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reach an uncontroversial conclusion. But it may not matter a
great deal for present purposes.
To the extent that the
lawfulness requirement of Article 17 factors in whether
interference is "predictable in the sense of rule of law,"3 83 the
NSA's secret bypassing of FISA between 2001 and 2005 was
clearly problematic.38 4
This is all the more true because
President Bush publicly endorsed the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001
as providing sufficient updates to the legal framework for
surveillance so as to make it possible to fight the War on
Terror. 385 In fact, Bush Administration officials claimed that
warrants
remained
necessary
for conducting
domestic
surveillance.3 86 While such statements may have deceived would-

be terrorists into thinking that their data and communications
were only being collected to the extent permitted by the FISA

framework (as modified by the USA PATRIOT Act), they also
deceived the innocent. The ensuing collection of Americans'
foreign communications was not predictable because the law-as
understood by nearly everyone outside the executive branchexplicitly prohibited it."'

As we have seen, once the program was disclosed, the
government made various efforts to update the domestic legal
framework to enable it to continue the program with fewer doubts

about the legality of its activities-culminating, for now, in the
passage of the FAA in 2008 and its recent renewal. At various
points, as the scope of the law expanded, greater portions of the

program presumably began to fall under its coverage.

Yet

questions still remain as to whether the law provides
predictability in any meaningful sense. David Kris, a former
Assistant Attorney General with the National Security Division

of the Justice Department, has long claimed that the government
interprets the FAA to permit the collection of purely domestic
communications if that collection is done in service of gathering

information on a legitimate target. 388

Reporting from August

the Administration,94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
383. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 383.
384. Warrantless surveillance continued after 2005, potentially up to 2008 and
even to the time of this writing, but as of the end of 2005, the public was on notice
that the government had adopted the practice.
385. GREENWALD, supra note 60, at 14.
386. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 4.
387. Additionally, judges who have reached the question have enforced FISA's
exclusivity clause as legally binding, as we will discuss below.
388. David Kravets, House Approves Sweeping, WarrantlessElectronic Spy Powers,
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2013 seems to confirm that reading, though the FISC has ruled at
least some such collection unconstitutional. 389 Even with some
limitations imposed by an irritated FISC, that interpretation of
the FAA continues to deny Americans genuine predictability,
especially in light of public statements by the head of the NSA
denying the agency's technical ability to capture purely domestic
communications.3 90 In short, there is no meaningful sense in
which the information being gathered on Americans is
predictable under domestic law. Moreover, because Clapper has
rendered it particularly difficult to mount a challenge to the
constitutionality of the FAA, questions remain as to whether the
applicable domestic law is in fact valid under the United States
Constitution.
3.

SKEPTICISM OF THE PROGRAM'S LEGALITY FROM
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Third, and as a related matter, the opinions of government
officials on the legality of the program are far from uniform.
Recall in particular that judicial opinions are relevant for
determining whether a program is "lawful" under Article 17,
pertaining as they do directly to the standing of the law.3 9 ' Three
federal judges have, at various points, ruled against the program.
In August of 2006, Judge Anna Taylor Diggs of the Eastern
District of Michigan ruled (in ACLU v. NSA) that the NSA
program violated both FISA and the United States
Constitution.3 9 2 Her ruling concerned the program in its form as
originally disclosed in 2005-when it involved entirely
warrantless collection of emails and phone calls between a party
within the United States and a party abroad. 393

WIRED, Sept. 12, 2012, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/house-approvesspy-bill/.
389. See supra text accompanying note 233.
390. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 176 (detailing General Alexander's testimony
before Congress about the NSA's inability to conduct certain domestic surveillance).
In that testimony, Alexander explicitly claimed that the "NSA does not have the
ability" or "capacity" to identify the American parties to a domestic email exchange,
lacking the requisite "technical insights into the United States." Id.
391. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 382 (noting the relevance of "judicial directives").
392. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D.
Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); see Dan Eggen & Dafna Linzer,
Judge Rules Against Wiretaps, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2006, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/17/AR2006081700650.html.
393. See Eggen & Linzer, supra note 392.
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That decision was vacated a year later by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which (in a 2-1 decision
that foreshadowed Clapper) found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the program because they could not show
that they had been harmed by it.3 94 In his dissent, Judge Ronald
Gilman voted to affirm Judge Diggs's decision, agreeing that the
At the time, Glenn Greenwald
NSA program was illegal."9
observed that in finding standing for the plaintiffs, Judge Gilman
became both the second non-FISC judge to assess the program
and the second to find it illegal.3 9 6
In 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of
California became the third non-FISC judge who reached the
merits of an NSA program-question to find the program illegal. 9
He ruled that the government violated FISA when, without a
warrant, it intercepted the international phone calls of an
Oregon-based Islamic charity. 39 8 The case did not raise questions
about standing because the charity was able to marshal public
information to prove that it had been subjected to warrantless
surveillance. 3 99 The ruling once again counted toward the
illegality of the government's efforts to gather communications of
Americans without following the FISA warrant procedures.
Beyond the judiciary, a number of government officials have
expressed serious concerns about the legality of the NSA
program. Perhaps most strikingly, the Bush Administration's
decision to reauthorize the program despite opposition from the
Office of Legal Counsel nearly prompted mass resignations at the
Department of Justice in 2004, according to a high-placed official
in the Administration. 4 00 At the time, the Office of Legal Counsel
394. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 693-720 (agreeing that the program was in violation of FISA).
396. Glenn Greenwald, The criminal NSA eavesdroppingprogram, SALON (Apr. 1,
2010, 7:02 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/04/01/nsa_4/.
397. Id.
398. Charlie Savage & James Risen, Federal Judge Finds N.S.A. Wiretaps Were
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/us/
Olnsa.html?ref-foreignintelligencesurveillanceactfisa&_r=0.
399. Id.
400. See U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on the U.S. Attorney
Firings, 110th Cong. 10-25, 18 (2007) (statement of James Comey, Former Dep. Att'y
Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter Comey Testimony], available at
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown universityjaw/files/comey.transcript.pdf
(describing the incident).
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was evaluating the legal basis for the NSA program, which at
that point required the periodic approval of the Attorney
General.4 0 ' The reason for the review by the Justice Department
is not clear, but it could relate to the complaints of FISC Judge
Kollar-Kotelly about the government's use of information
obtained from the NSA program to secure FISA warrants in other
cases (discussed above).40 2 Attorney General John Ashcroft and
his deputy James Comey had come to the conclusion that they
could not certify the NSA program as legal.4 0 3 When the Bush
Administration nonetheless decided to reauthorize the program, a
large number of people at the Department of Justice-and even
the FBI Director-prepared to resign.4 0 4 The Administration
ultimately backed off, accepting changes to the program
requested by the Department of Justice.40 5
A number of other government officials have also expressed
concerns at various points about the legality of the NSA program,
including former Assistant Attorney General David Kris,4 0 6
former NSA crypto-mathematician James Binney,4 0 7 and certain
FBI personnel (including former FBI director Robert Mueller).4 0 8
Numerous legislators have expressed the view that the program
is or may be illegal, including Senators Russ Feingold, Jack Reed,
Arlen Specter,40 9 Rand Paul,4 1 0 Jeff Merkley, Bob Corker, Mark
401. Id. Note that Comey refused in his testimony to identify which program he
was describing, but subsequent reporting seems to confirm that it was the collection
of Americans' email under the NSA program that caused the controversy. Risen &
Lichtblau, E-Mail Surveillance, supra note 162.
402. See supra text accompanying note 90.
403. Comey Testimony, supra note 400. The series of events surrounding the
decision by Ashcroft and Comey was surprisingly dramatic. Hours after they jointly
decided not to recertify the program, Ashcroft became very ill and was admitted to
the intensive care unit at a local hospital, making Comey the acting Attorney
General. Id. Comey communicated to the White House that he would not certify the
program, so White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez and President Bush's Chief of
Staff Andrew Card attempted to visit Ashcroft in intensive care to get him to
overrule Comey. Id. Comey learned of their plans and raced to the hospital, arriving
minutes before them and setting up a tense confrontation. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Kravets, supra note 388.
407. Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
408. Comey Testimony, supra note 400; Lichtblau & Risen, supranote 157.
409. Inquiry into leak of NSA spying program launched, CNN (Dec. 30, 2005, 9:26
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005IPOLITICS/12/30/nsa.leak/.
410. See Molly Reilly, Rand Paul: NSA Surveillance Programs Warrant Supreme
Court Challenge, HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
9,
2013,
10:32
AM),
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41
Udall, ' and (arguably)
Ron Wyden, 412 as well as Representatives
413 and Justin Amash. 414
Rush Holt

Thus, there is good reason to believe that the NSA program
is not, or has not always been, consistent with United States
domestic law. Many of the concerns from government officials,
including judges, predated the passage of the FAA and related to
the use of the program to sidestep the FISA framework (as in the
various federal court rulings and the revolt at the Department of
Justice). At the very least, then, until the domestic legal
framework caught up to the program (whether that occurred with
the PAA in 2007 or the FAA in 2008), there is a nontrivial
probability that parts of the program were simply illegal under
domestic law-and, accordingly, the ICCPR.
4.

LEGAL IMMUNITY OF IMPLICATED PRIVATE PARTIES

Fourth, one of the most controversial aspects of the FAA of
2008 was that it retroactively and prospectively immunized
private parties involved in the NSA program.4 15 Those provisions
were especially valuable to major telecoms, many of which began
turning over calling records and assisting the government in
conducting warrantless surveillance. While the telecoms had
acted at the request of the government, they were vulnerable to
civil and criminal liability under the original FISA statute.4 1 6

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/09/rand-paul-nsan 3411587.html (reporting
on Senator Paul's interest in challenging the NSA program at the Supreme Court
level).
411. See Sam Stein & Michael McAuliff, NSA Collection Of Verizon Phone Records
Defended By Top Senators, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2013, 12:50 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/06/verizon-phone-records-nsa-n_3397058.ht
ml?utm-hp-ref=politics (quoting Senators Merkley, Corker and Udall all expressing
reservations about the permissibility of the program).
412. See, e.g., Jathan Sadowski, Ron Wyden's Warning: America May Be on Track
SLATE
(July
23,
2013,
5:05 PM)
to Become Surveillance State,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/futuretense/2013/07/23/ron-wyden-dangers-of nsasurv
eillance.and-the patriotact.html (quoting Wyden's deep concerns about the NSA
program's implications for our "constitutional history").
413. Risen & Lichtblau, E-Mail Surveillance, supra note 162.
414. See Weisman, supra note 239 (referring to Amash's opposition to the program
as reflecting his concerns about of its conformity to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution); FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
WALL. ST. J. (June 19, 2008, 6:24 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBl21391360949290049.
415. Hess, supra note 10.
416. Id.
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While it is hard to imagine that the government would prosecute
the companies under a law it too had circumvented, particularly
in light of the companies' cooperation, forty-six civil suits were
pending against the telecoms when the FAA took effect,417
collectively seeking hundreds of billions in damages.4 1 ' The law's
immunity provisions abruptly preempted all of these suits. 419
The fact that the telecoms were vulnerable to civil liability in
the first place is highly suggestive, though not determinative, of
legal transgressions on their part. After all, if it were reasonably
clear that they had not broken any laws, retroactive immunity
would have been unnecessary and there probably would not have
been nearly four-dozen pending lawsuits against them. This
point is relevant in two respects. First, and most obviously, it
contributes to the sense that the original instantiation of the
program was illegal under domestic law.
Second, recall Nowak's discussion of the positive obligations
on states under Article 17.420 The Human Rights Committee has
also discerned those positive obligations: "States parties are
under a duty themselves not to engage in interferences
inconsistent with article 17 of the Covenant and to provide the
legislative framework prohibiting such acts by natural or legal
persons." 421 Although the passage of FISA in 1978 predated the
relevant commentary of the Committee, FISA's terms would
arguably satisfy the Committee's interpretation.
However,
retroactively immunizing those private actors who then violated
the law runs completely against the grain of the state's positive
obligation to ensure protection of the rights that even the
domestic law plainly recognized. To the extent the FAA rolls
back the liability of private actors for violations of the right to
privacy, it constitutes an affirmative step against the dictates of
Article 17: it encourages private actors to participate in the
violation of the right to privacy rather than incentivizing them to
respect it.
5.

SCOPE AND INDISCRIMINATE NATURE
Fifth, the NSA program has grown so large that it is unclear

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Hess, supra note 10.
Recent Legislation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2009).
Hess, supranote 10.
See supra text accompanying note 268.
General Comment 16, supra note 289, 1 9.
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if it meets the substantive requirements of the lawfulness clause
of Article 17, even to the extent that the program has, since 2008,
been governed by a domestic statute. As the Human Rights
Committee has explained, "[i]nterference authorized by States
can only take place on the basis of law, which itself must comply
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant." 4 2 2 It is
not at all obvious that the FAA conforms to the provisions, aims,
or objectives of the ICCPR. As noted above, it allows for officials
from the executive branch-not judges-to issue broad, yearlong
warrants that target individuals and groups abroad. Moreover,
as reporting in August of 2013 has revealed, the government
interprets the FAA to permit the collection of communications
between individuals who are not suspected of any wrongdoing but
whose correspondence might be relevant to an investigation of
targeted individuals. Additionally, Verizon has been turning over
all of its calling records to the government, which is also
gathering hundreds of millions of transactional data points about
a wide range of Americans' activities. 4 23 Even presuming these
practices are permissible under domestic law, the indiscriminate
nature of such data collection raises a similar concern as the
broad FAA warrant provision. (This is, in some ways, the second
complaint one might raise against the immunity provision, but
here it is applied to the targeting provisions of the FAA and the
business records provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.) 4 2 4
These are not merely abstract worries. The Human Rights
Committee has articulated standards for legislation with respect
to the protection of correspondence:
Even with regard to interferences that conform to the
Covenant, relevant legislation must specify in detail the
precise circumstances in which such interferences may be
permitted. A decision to make use of such authorized
interference must be made only by the authority designated
under the law, and on a case-by-case basis. Compliance with
article 17 requires that the integrity and confidentiality of
422. General Comment 16, supra note 289, 3.
423. Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records, supranote 2.
424. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Second and Third Periodic Reports
(USA), j 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (expressing concern
about the USA PATRIOT Act even before recent disclosures revealed the
government's broad interpretation of Section 215, the "business records" provision of
the Act).
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correspondence should be guaranteed de jure and de facto.
Correspondence should be delivered to the addressee without
interception and without being opened or otherwise read.
Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions
of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of communication,
wire-tapping and recording of conversations should be
prohibited.425
Under the FAA, it seems as if most of these requirements are
subject to frequent violation. Note in particular the demand that
authorized interference should be approved on a case-by-case
basis. The broad intercept orders permitted by the FAA are not
nearly that targeted.4 26
Note also the requirement that
legislation ought to spell out the precise conditions that would
permit interference. Under the FAA, the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence secretly submit their
targeting provisions to the FISC, so that information is rarely
available to the public.42 7
6. OUTSOURCING OF IMPERMISSIBLE SURVEILLANCE

Sixth, and finally, recall the discussion of the United States
position on the territorial scope of the ICCPR,4 2 8 and in
particular, its view that its duties under the ICCPR extend only
to those within both its territory and jurisdiction. We have
proceeded on the assumption that the United States'
interpretation is the correct one-not out of agreement with that
position (which is both at odds with the position of the Human
Rights Committee and maximally restrictive vis-i-vis the
ICCPR), but because doing so shows that even under less
controversial assumptions, there appear to be serious problems
for the legal position of the United States. After all, a primary
point of focus in the controversy about United States government
surveillance has been its ability to gather information directly
about people within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.4 2 9
425. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 424, 8.
426. See ACLU Letter, supra note 3 (criticizing the law for allowing extremely
broad, non-particularized warrants).
427. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1881a (2008) (explaining submission to the FISC).
428. See supra Section III(A).
429. To the extent that the controversy has concerned either the United States
Constitution or FISA, this is effectively true by definition. Indeed, several of the
sources cited above-see, for example, CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22;
Cauley, supra note 81; ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 114; Nakashima, supra
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But there have also been allegations that the United States
bypasses some concerns about conducting domestic surveillance
by collaborating with other countries that gather information on
Americans.
James Bamford has detailed some of these allegations in his
reporting for Wired Magazine, in which he notes that the United
States has very close relationships with Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.43 0 He claims that these
five countries frequently collaborate on matters of surveillance,
referring to themselves (in rather Orwellian fashion) as the "Five
Eyes."43 1
According to Adrienne Kinne, the former voice
interceptor referred to in other reporting by Bamford, this group
of countries had an agreement prior to 9/11 not to spy on each
other's citizens; however, that has changed, and these
governments now frequently act on requests to perform
surveillance for each other.4 3 2
If Bamford's reporting is accurate, then the United States
could be taking advantage of the fact that although its domestic
legislation regulates its own conduct on its own soil, that
legislation does not reach the behavior of other countries. But the
ICCPR does not make any such distinction. If the United States
cannot
actually
protect
Americans'
information
and
communications from interception by foreign governments (and if
those countries have no obligations under the ICCPR to abstain
from collecting that information, as the United States' position
would seem to imply), it would still seem completely in tension
with the object and purpose of the treaty for the United States
simply to outsource impermissible domestic surveillance to
foreign parties that are, in its view, free from the same
restrictions.
B. APPLYING "ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE" TO THE NSA
PROGRAM

The disjunctive phrasing of Article 17(1) clearly implies that
note 230; An Impeachable Offense?, supra note 45-all refer in their titles specifically
to the interests of Americans. The DOJ controversy that nearly resulted in mass
resignations appears to have concerned the privacy rights of Americans as well. See
supra note 401.
430. Bamford, Whistleblowers, supra note 176.
431. Id.
432. Id.
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lawfulness and non-arbitrariness are both necessary conditions
for permissible state interference with the right to privacy
(barring certain general exceptions)-and that the two terms are
not coextensive. 4 33 Indeed, this is the position taken by VoliO4 3 4
and Nowak.43 5 Volio claims that while "arbitrary" can imply
"unlawful," it also means "capricious, despotic, imperious,
tyrannical, or uncontrolled.... [A]s well as 'incompatible with the
principles of justice' and human dignity."43 6 More precisely,
"[a]ction may be arbitrary even when it is not a violation of
positive law if the legislation is itself unreasonable or
capricious." 4 3 7 Nowak observes that during the debates about
how to interpret the two words, "it was stressed above all that
'arbitrary' clearly went beyond 'unlawful' and contained an
element of 'capriciousness.' 4 38 The ICCPR draws the term from
Article 12 of the UDHR, and according to Nowak, it contains
"elements of injustice, unpredictability and unreasonableness."43 9
Perhaps most significantly, the Human Rights Committee
itself views "unlawful" and "arbitrary" as providing different
coverage:
In the Committee's view the expression "arbitrary
interference" can also extend to interference provided for
under the law. The introduction of the concept of
arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference
provided for by law should be in accordance with the
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should
be, in any event, reasonable in the particular
circumstances.440
The Committee has further developed its Article 17
definition of "arbitrary" through case law. In Canepa v. Canada,
it

held that "arbitrariness . . . is

not confined

to

procedural

arbitrariness, but extends to the reasonableness of the
interference with the person's rights under Article 17 and its

433. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 17(1) ("No one shall be subject to arbitrary or
unlawful interference. . . .").
434. Volio, supra note 261, at 191.
435. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 382.
436. Volio, supra note 261, at 191.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 382.
439. Id. at 382-83.
440. General Comment 16, supra note 289, 1 4.
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compatibility with the purposes, aims and objectives of the

Covenant." 441
Aside from the controversial "extra-legal" beginnings of the
NSA program, another major point of concern from critics is
precisely that it is arbitrary. There are several ways in which the
program might trigger concern under the "arbitrariness" prong of
Article 17: through the accidental over-collection of information;
the sheer breadth of the program; and the initial warrantless
phase of the program.
1.

ACCIDENTAL OVER-COLLECTION OF DATA

Accidental over-collection of data bears on lawfulness, as
discussed above, but it is also arbitrary by definition (even in the
subset of cases where it is also legal under domestic law) because
it is not executed for cause. Such collection would be especially
problematic in those cases lacking a legitimate auxiliary
justification for collecting the data, but it is troubling in any form.
Moreover, the consistency with which errors at the NSA result in
over-collection of data-thousands of times per year in D.C.-area
offices alone-reveals a systemic problem with significant
implications for the covenant's non-arbitrariness requirement.
Additionally, recall further the allegations of a former NSA
analyst that the agency had gained warrantless access to
Americans' emails through a large database called "Pinwale,"
beginning as early as 2005.442 The analyst claimed that the
agency would run searches in the database and accept an
incidental yield of Americans' communications as high as thirty
percent.44 3
These claims suggest a protocol that routinely
permitted the substantial, unintended over-collection of data in a
manner that does not itself register as a problem within the NSA.
Such collection would seem to be arbitrary in the sense of lacking
cause, and it is unlikely to be reported as an "incident" on an
internal audit because it falls within the agency's defined
parameters for acceptable rates of error.

11.4, U.N. Doc.
441. Canepa v. Canada, Comm. No. 558/1993,
(June 20, 1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edul
CCPRIC/59/D/558/1993
humanrts/undocs/558-1993.html, quoted in NOWAK, supra note 21, at 384.
442. Risen & Lichtblau, E-Mail Surveillance, supra note 162.
443. Id.
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2.

SCOPE AND INDISCRIMINATE NATURE

Just as the NSA program's overwhelming size raises
concerns that it is unlawful, as discussed above, the implications
of the program's size for the applicable standards of suspicion
introduces arbitrariness concerns as well. The NSA has a reason
for wanting to collect as much information as possible, which
differentiates massive, deliberate collection from systematic if
unintended over-collection; however, given the sensitivity of the
information sought, merely finding utility in collecting the
information is unlikely to save the program from violating the
non-arbitrariness restriction. The allegations of David Kris and
James Binney are particularly relevant here, but even if one
takes a skeptical position on their claims, the Washington Post's
report that close to 2 billion calls and emails are intercepted
every day raises questions about how the collection could fail to
be capricious.44 4 More recently, according to the Washington
Post, the NSA has gathered 250 million Internet communications
through § 702 of the FAA alone.44 5 The NSA also (very quickly)
copies and searches communications between "untargeted"
individuals to see if they refer to targeted individuals or matters.
Both of these facts are strongly suggestive of arbitrariness in a
substantive sense: they reveal deeply intrusive practices that
affect people who are not at all suspected of wrongdoing.
The same point stands with respect to the collection of
transactional data.4 4 6 Recall Binney's claims that AT&T turned
over all of its calling records (in addition to providing wiretap
access to ongoing calls) 447 and the reporting in the Wall Street
Journal concerning collection of financial data and other private

444. Binney's estimate that 15 to 20 trillion communications have been collected
since 9/11 would support the same conclusion. Of course, on the United States'
conservative reading of the territorial scope of the ICCPR, some subset of these
communications might be fair game under the ICCPR. But, to the extent that
reporting has repeatedly confirmed huge volumes of domestic American
communications being caught up in the dragnet, the ultimate conclusion remains the
same.
445. Craig Timberg & Barton Gellman, NSA paying U.S. companies for access to
communications networks, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/nsa-paying-us-companies-for-access-to-communicationsnetworks/2013/08/29/5641a4b6-10c2-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94al-story_1.html.
446. If anything, the apparently lower domestic legal standards for securing
transactional data would seem to provide even more cause for concern on this score.
447. See Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
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"transactional" details about individuals.4 4 8 Recall also that
Verizon has been turning over all of its transactional calling data,
regardless of whether the data pertain to people who are under
suspicion. The Human Rights Committee has taken a position on
the collection of such data, stipulating that ". . . the competent

public authorities should only be able to call for such information
relating to an individual's private life the knowledge of which is
essential in the interests of society as understood under the
Covenant."44 9 Untargeted collection of the sort documented above
is so broad that it would seem impossible to escape the conclusion
that it is arbitrary in the sense defined by Nowak, Volio, and the
Human Rights Committee.
3. INITIAL WARRANTLESS STAGES OF THE PROGRAM
Finally, any interference with the right to privacy that
occurs without a warrant is, in some sense, arbitrary, particularly
in a system that places a premium on due process guarantees.
The term "warrant" implies proper authorization, and warrants
play a crucial role in shielding Americans from unreasonable
searches in United States constitutional law. As discussed in
substantial detail above, the first several years of the NSA
program involved the substantial, warrantless collection of
personal data. Additionally, for six months in late 2007 and early
2008, under the PAA, executive branch officials (rather than
judges) issued the targeting authorizations for the NSA
program-both for foreigners and for Americans. As a result,
these authorizations may not have amounted to warrants in any
meaningful sense. 450 Even now, under the FAA, executive
448. See Gorman, NSA's Domestic Spying, supra note 79.
449. General Comment 16, supra note 289, 7.
450. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Considerationof Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Fourth Periodic Report
(Netherlands), T 15, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/NLD/CO/4 (Aug. 25, 2009) (urging The
Netherlands to "amend its legislation to ensure that its counter-terrorism measures
do not conflict with article 17 of the Covenant and that effective safeguards,
including judicial oversight, are in place to counter abuses"); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Sixth Periodic Report (Sweden), 1 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6 (May
7, 2009) ("The State party should take all appropriate measures to ensure that the
gathering, storage and use of personal data not be subject to any abuses, not be used
for purposes contrary to the Covenant, and be consistent with obligations under
article 17 of the Covenant. To that effect, the State party should guarantee that the
processing and gathering of information be subject to review and supervision by an
independent body with the necessary guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness.").
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officials continue to issue warrants for foreign targets, raising the
same issues. Moreover, those FAA warrants are broad and
yearlong, making them so sweeping that they appear to allow the
collection of largely incidental private information relating to
people who are suspected of no wrongdoing whatsoever. The link
between the authorization and the collection is so tenuous that
these collections are "warranted" only in the loosest sense of the
word. As a result, the FAA itself may violate the ICCPR.
Similarly, Bamford has alleged that there are approximately one
million people on agency watch lists. 45 1 The standard for
suspicion must be quite low if so many people clear the bar; if the
standard itself is sufficiently low, the law that codifies it could
well be arbitrary.
VI. DRAWING SOME CONCLUSIONS
Both the Human Rights Committee and Manfred Nowak
argue that Article 17 permits interference with the right to
privacy only when it is lawful, non-arbitrary, and proportionate to
the pursuit of a legitimate aim. 45 2 The preceding analysis
highlights a number of ways in which the NSA program seems
both unlawful and arbitrary: fatal flaws under the dominant
interpretation of Article 17. Even if the United States were to
take the position-in good faith-that the NSA program is
essential for national security, the standard analysis would seem
to suggest that the program needs substantial revisions to bring
it into line with the terms of the ICCPR.
We have already foreclosed the possibility that national
security could justify unlawful and arbitrary interference with
the right to privacy; that reading is implausible because of its
implications, not to mention the fact that it is in tension with the
451. Bamford, NSA Spy Center, supra note 79.
28 ("The framework of
452. See Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 294,
article 17 of the ICCPR enables necessary, legitimate and proportionate restrictions
to the right to privacy by means of permissible limitations."); InternationalPrinciples
on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY &
PROPORTIONATE (July 2013), available at https://en.necessaryandproportionate.sorg/
text#_edn2 (offering, in the Preamble, a general statement of principles for guiding
the right to privacy across international human rights law, and using a similar
formulation). This Article has not focused on proportionality-a largely secondary,
empirical question that the preceding analysis suggests we need not reach, given the
myriad ways in which the program appears to conflict with the direct language of the
ICCPR. Nevertheless, the truly massive size of the program would set a high bar for
any countervailing considerations necessary to establish proportionality.
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major interpretations of the ICCPR and the European
Convention. But perhaps there is a more promising indicator for
the United States in the deference shown by the ECtHR where
states parties assert national security as the justification for their
interference with the right to privacy.
Recall that the ECtHR places substantial weight on the
existence of "formal legality and procedural guarantees."4 53 More
specifically, in addition to insisting that the state act in
accordance with its own domestic laws (thus ensuring formal
legality), clarity about the "scope and manner of exercise" of the
state's activities are important considerations in assessing the
permissibility of interference with the right to privacy under
Article 8 of the European Convention.45 4 If those conditions are
met, and the purpose of the interference is legitimate (such as
protecting national security), then the ECtHR is likely to defer to
the state actor.
Even here, however, the United States would struggle. Set
aside the fact that, for much of its duration, the NSA program
lacked formal legality. Perhaps more significantly, even now the
program has weak procedural guarantees, with (among other
things) a limited role for the courts, frequent over-collection of
information by the government, and only the most modest of roles
for particularized suspicion in targeting. Moreover, as the
ongoing leaks about the program demonstrate, many of the
government's activities remain hidden from public view,
necessarily rendering impossible a wide understanding of their
nature and scope. Perhaps the United States could modify the
NSA program in a way that would allow it to retain its breadth
while also complying with the sorts of criteria valued by the
ECtHR. Perhaps the government could reveal the program more
fully to the public. But until and unless that happens, a
favorable verdict by analogy is unlikely.
In sum, it is obviously difficult to reach conclusive opinions
about the legality of the NSA program (or its various constituent
parts) under the ICCPR in part because some of our analysis is
built on credible but disputed reporting on the program itself. At
the very least, we need additional, concrete information about
Further, the
how the government executes the program.
453. HARRIS, O'BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 275, at 354.

454. See supra text accompanying note 317.
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arguments on either side are relatively complicated and can
develop in a range of different ways. But at a minimum, even on
conservative assumptions about the nature of the program and
the scope of the ICCPR, we face the legitimate and frightening
prospect that the United States is systematically and massively
violating the human right to privacy.
What happens now? Selective leaks in the media help to
shed light on parts of the program, but the government is
unlikely to turn over any more comprehensive information
voluntarily. The limited congressional oversight that occurred
shortly after the program became known fell far short of the
public accountability created by investigations into spying abuses
in the mid-1970s. Despite a string of recent revelations, the
current political climate is even less likely to lead to significant
oversight than it was in 2005 and 2006, as administrations of
both parties have now formally endorsed the FAA, thereby
illustrating their commitment to the NSA program.
But suppose we look at the issue from another angle. Why is
it that the arguments on both sides are so complicated and
uncertain? In part, the reason is that international human rights
bodies have not paid enough attention to the risks posed to
privacy by government surveillance programs. We have inferred
the various points of illicit contact between the NSA program and
the ICCPR by carefully reading both news reports about the
program and commentaries on the treaty. But the Human Rights
Committee's General Comment on the right to privacy is over
twenty-five years old, and no more than two-pages long; it lacks
important detail, and does not specifically address surveillance
practices that are certain to be in wide use around the world
today.
This Article essentially presents a case study about the
human right to privacy in the United States, as implicated by a
single-albeit major-national security initiative. The NSA has
multiple surveillance programs, and it is not the only agency
within the U.S. government that conducts surveillance here.
Most importantly, other countries conduct their own surveillance,
making this a global issue. Governments can discern the basic
form of their human rights obligations; they cannot be excused for
ignoring those obligations simply because it is possible to obscure
their activities behind the cloak of national security policy.
Nevertheless, it is much easier for them to duck their obligations
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when they can claim ambiguity in the law.
If human rights bodies were to take the matter seriously,
Articles like this one would not be necessary. Governments will
continue to hide information about their surveillance activities,
and it may be difficult to change that. But emphasis by human
rights bodies on the significance of the right to privacy, and the
elaboration of clear standards for compliance with it, would
constitute crucial steps in ensuring that states do not trample on
this core human right.

